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INTRODUCTION

So far as I have been able to determine, the literature of Western
jurisprudence and legal philosophy lacks any comprehensive and systematic treatment of the formal character of law in developed societies.' Later in this Article, I will explain at length what I mean by "the
formal character of law." For now, I will merely suggest what I mean.
By "the formal character of law," I mean first, that rules and other
legal precepts, basic functional elements of law such as legislatures
and courts, and the legal system taken as a whole, are all formal in the
sense that, in their very existence, they conform to accepted conceptions of their essential forms.2 For example, for a precept to conform
to the essential form of a rule, it must be at least minimally prescrip1 This is a further preliminary formulation of my general thesis that one of the fundamental characteristics of law is that it is formal. This and the prior formulations set forth
themes that will be developed much more fully in a book I am writing. A reader who turns
to the earlier versions will see that I have altered some of my earlier views considerably, and
that my overall thesis is in the course of evolution. See Robert S. Summers, The Formal
Characterof Law, 51 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 242 (1992); Robert S. Summers, Derformale Charakterdes
Rechts II, 80 ARCHrv FUR RECHTS UND SOZMAuIHILOSOPHIE 66 (1994); Robert S. Summers, The
Formal Characterof Law III, 25 RECHrSTHEORIE 125 (1994); see also Robert S. Summers, The
Juristic Study of Law's Formal Character, 8 RATIO JuRis 237 (1995); Robert S. Summers, A
Formal Theory of the Rule of Law, 6 RAio JuRis 127 (1993).
I am much indebted to several established scholars in the U.S.A., in Great Britain, in
Germany and elsewhere for ideas, stimulation, and encouragement, including especially
Professor Dr. Okko Behrends of the University of G~ttingen and Professor D. Neil MacCormick of the University of Edinburgh. In my forthcoming book, I will record these
substantial debts, and my gratitude, in full. For now, I wish to thank my secretary, Mrs.
Pam Finnigan, and my most recent student assistants and graduate students: Marshal
Grant, Cornell Law School Class of 1996; James Hannon, Cornell Law School Class of
1996; Eric Jacobs, Cornell Law School Class of 1997; Matthew Michaels, Cornell Law
School Class of 1997; Donald Stepka, Cornell Law School Class of 1997; and Laura McClellan, Cornell Law School Class of 1998. In addition, Andrew Sift, Cornell Law School Class
of 1997; Ted McCutcheon, Cornell Law School Class of 1998; and Mitchell Wong, Cornell
Law School Class of 1998 have been especially helpful. I also wish to thank a graduate
student who was at Cornell during 1996, Okko Hendrik Behrends, for discussion of themes
in the Article. In addition, I wish to record my special indebtedness to the faculty of the
University of Florida College of Law for their contributions to my thinking about the formal character of law. On November 19, 1992, April 12, 1995, and March 21, 1996, I conducted research seminars on various aspects of this subject with this faculty, and on March
22, 1996, I gave the Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law at the University of Florida on
this subject.
2 Though I use the expression "essential form," I do not intend to take sides in the
ancient nominalist-realist debate, nor do I mean to commit myself to any one model for
the analysis of concepts.
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five, minimally general, definite, and complete. But beyond this most
fundamental sense of "formal" in which legal phenomena at least minimally satisfy their defining essential forms as accepted in the society,
these phenomena are formal in still other ways.
Prescriptiveness, and some degrees of generality, definiteness,
and completeness are defining features of rules. Yet, in rules actually
created, such features typically go beyond the essential definitional
minimum. Such defining features and their extra-essential elaborations and variations are also formal in the further basic sense that they
are structural. These features together structure the form and content of a rule. But some formal features of rules are not defining features. For example, the degree of simplicity (or complexity) of a rule
is not a defining feature. Yet, it is a formal feature in the sense that it,
too, is structural. Rules are also formal in their mode of encapsulation: some take common law form, some statutory form, some constitutional form, and so on. Thus, features of rules are formal in the
foregoing three senses: "essentially," structurally, and encapsulatorily.
Rules are formal in still further distinct senses that I will explain.
At the same time, all other phenomena of the law besides rules
and other precepts are likewise formal in various senses apart from
their conformity to accepted minimal essential forms. For example,
basic functional elements of a legal system such as legislatures and
courts are formal in the sense that they, too, have structural features.
They are formal in the sense that they have procedural features. They
are formal in the sense that their institutional features overall are relatively definitive. They are formal in the sense that they are, to an extent, fixed according to rules or other precepts, and so, are
"preceptually" formal. Similar truths also apply, mutatis mutandis,to a
legal system considered as a functioning whole. A legal system is formal in its structure, in its coherence, and in its methodical nature. In
sum, the phenomena of law are formal, in various senses which are all
well-established in the English language. Thus, as I will demonstrate,
formality is a pervasive, varied, and complex general characteristic of
law. Moreover, the formality of law in all its varieties poses countless
choices of form in the construction and operation of any legal system,
choices that implicate not merely problem-specific policies, but also
fundamental political values, general legal values, equitable considerations, private preferences, and more.
Because form in the law is a means to such ends, it may or may
not be appropriate to those ends. In a particular rule or in a basic
functional element such as a court, a formal feature may be illdesigned and so, inappropriate. But it does not follow that "form,"
"formal," "formality," and "formalism" generally have pejorative meanings in the English language, or even in legal usage. They do not. Yet
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some inhabitants of the American legal academy tend not to differentiate between the formal and the formalistic. They also tend to collapse the formal into the formalistic, and frequently end up using
"form," "formal," "formality," and "formalism" pejoratively. 3 I do not
follow them here.
In relation to rules, specific phenomena of law such as legislatures and courts, and the system as a whole, I use form and its derivatives neither pejoratively nor honorifically, but neutrally. However, I
do distinguish between form that is appropriate and form that is inappropriate, in light of the ends to be served and other factors. Plainly,
within a particular system, a particular formal feature may at a given
time be inappropriate. Thus, such a feature may be overformal, and
so formalistic; or it may be underformal, and so substantivistic; or it
may be malformed in some other way. What is, or is not, appropriate
form is a complex question. But it is certainly true that "more formal"
does not necessarily translate into "appropriately formal," and "less
formal" does not necessarily translate into "inappropriately formal." I
wish at the outset to make clear, too, that I do not embrace pre-realist
4
formalism.
This, however, is primarily a jurisprudential article, and I will not
concern myself with issues of legal reform, i.e., with reforming the
formalistic, or the substantivistic, or whatever, in any particular system.
Nor will I be concerned with comparing two or more systems in overall degrees of formality. 5 Rather, my focus will be on formality as a
general characteristic of law in Western systems of law, more particularly, in Anglo-American and Western European systems, for these are
the systems with which I am most familiar. My main questions will be
these: How is law formal? What are the main varieties of formality in
law? Why is appropriate form in the law important? Of course, I do
not hold that appropriate form in the law is all that is required for law
to be good and effective. Substantive policy and other values must
play major roles. So, too, must societal attitudes of agreement, acceptance, and acquiescence in the law's methodology and its operation.
Also, a legal system requires trained personnel, material resources,
knowledge, language, and more. Thus, there is obviously much more
to an effective legal system than form. But form is indispensable, and
it may even be said that it is appropriate form that binds all the requisite ingredients into operational law.
3 See, e.g., RicHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, passim (1990);
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, passim (1975).
4
See ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY
(1982) (explaining and criticizing pre-realist formalism at length).

136-75

5
For such an effort, see generally P.S. ATAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FoRM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1987) (comparing U.S. and U.K. legal systems).
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To my knowledge, no Western legal theorist has ever given due
credit to the formal character of law.6 Even the European and British
6 The general thesis that one of law's fundamental characteristics is that it is formal
in character, has not, so far as I am aware, been the subject of any extended systematic
study in English, German, French, Italian or Spanish. My Scandinavian colleagues tell me
the same is true of their literature. The formal character of law is not the thesis of ATIvAH
& SUMMERS, supranote 5. Rather, in that book, Professor Atiyah and I identified a variety

of types of formality in law and compared their differing manifestations in the English and
American systems, and offered explanations for the differences. In that book, we also used
a different typology of form from that which I use here. We did, however, treat tangentially much that is relevant to my present thesis, and I am, accordingly, indebted to that
work and to Professor Atiyah as well. My own first published work on themes associated
with law's formal nature is: Robert S. Summers, Working Conceptions of "The Law," 1 L. &
PHIL. 263 (1982).

In my thinking about the formal character of law, I have found the writings of the
nineteenth-century German jurist, Rudolf vonJhering, to be the most useful. See 2 RUDOLF
VONJHERING, GEIST DES ROMISCHEN RECHTs (Darmstadt 1993) [hereinafterJHERiNG, GEIsTr;
RUDOLF VONJHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husik trans., 1913) (1903) [here-

inafter JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS]. I have also found certain works of Max Weber useful,
especially in avoiding pitfalls. See MAX WEBER, CRITIQUE OF STAMMLER passim (Guy Oakes
trans., 1977) (1907).
There are importantjurisprudential works that address in a general way one or more
facets of law's formal character without advancing a general thesis to that effect. See, e.g.,
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw passim (2d ed. 1994); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY
OF LAW AND STATE passim (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945) (1905); HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY passim (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L.

Paulson trans., 1992) (1934); see alsoLON L. FULLER, THE MORAmTY OF LAW passim (2d ed.
1969) (addressing one major facet of the formal character of law, namely, the principles of
legality (often also called the rule of law)).
This is not to say there are no jurisprudential books with such words as "form" or
"formal" in the title! There are. See, e.g., THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, EssAYs UPON THE

FORM OF THE LAw (1870); GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO, THE FORMAL BASES OF LAW (John Lisle
trans., 1914). The first of these works is in the Benthamite spirit and advocates that law be
expressed largely in statutory or code form. The second book, especially at pages 68-125,
addresses what the author calls "the logical form of law" and a "formal analysis of the
concept of law," but one does not find a systematic and extended development of the
varieties of form in law and how they matter.
There are various jurisprudential works on "legal formalism," a phrase that, like the
word "formal," is sometimes used pejoratively. See supra note 3. One theorist who does not
use the word formal pejoratively is Professor Ernest Weinrib. See, e.g., ErnestJ. Weinrib,
LegalFormalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97YALE L.J. 949, 950-57 (1988) [hereinafter Weinrib, Legal Formalism]; ErnestJ. Weinrib, TheJurisprudenceof Legal Formalism, 16
HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 583, 583-89 (1993) [hereinafter Weinrib, Jurisprudence]. Professor
Weinrib describes the "project of legal formalism" in these terms: "Formalism is a theory
of legal justification. As a theory ofjustification,formalism considers law to be not merely a
collection of posited norms or an exercise of official power, but a social arrangement responsive to moral argument." Weinrib, Jurisprudence,supra, at 583. My own work on the
formal character of law, while not inconsistent with some aspects of the foregoing formulation, nevertheless differs in major ways. First, one of Professor Weinrib's primary aims is to
refute a thesis of the Critical Legal Studies Movement (the inseparability of law and politics). See Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra, at 950-52. My thesis is not so motivated. Second,
Weinrib views form as including the full "ensemble of characteristics that constitute" law.
Id. at 958. My thesis focuses on formality as one basic overall characteristic of law, and
within that focus treats a number of varieties of formality in addition to what I call essential
form. I focus on the conceptual and descriptive far more than he does. Third, Weinrib
uses as fundamental units of analysis such notions as "juridical relationship," "immanent
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positivists, whose interests have been more formal than other theorists, have failed to address this subject systematically and in depth. I
believe that one major explanation for the neglect of law's formal
character in Western jurisprudence is that we have never enjoyed a
7
satisfactory conceptual account of what it is in law that is truly formal.
With such an account, we would be in a better position to see form in
the law for what it is, and to give it its due. To some, this explanation
might seem quite implausible, for whatever the extent and importance of form in the law, this must be right in front of us for everyone
to see. Yet, no less a figure in twentieth-century philosophy than Ludwig Wittgenstein stressed that:
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden
to notice
because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable
8
something-because it is always before one's eyes.)

rationality," "intelligibility," and "coherence." See id. passim. My own fundamental units of
analysis are quite different. Fourth, Weinrib generally resists conceiving of law in instrumentalist terms. See id. at 966-72. While I criticize crude instrumentalism, I treat appropriate form as an indispensable means to policy and other values.
There is also a large body of books and legal periodical literature addressed partly to
specific aspects of the role of form in law. Some of these books are highly illuminating.

See, e.g.,

FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALrn

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF

RULES passim
(1991). Professor Schauer's book may be the best book ever written on rules. While much
of what I now say and will say in my book about rules is compatible with his work, there are
major differences. For example, I emphasize more than he does the perspective of citizens
and others on the front lines of human interaction who must apply rules in advance of and
in the absence of particular disputes. I also give more of a place than he does to what I call
general legal values (for him, "formal values") in response to charges of "rule-worship." See
SCHAUER, supra, at 132-33, 135-66. Further, I attempt to provide a more systematic and
comprehensive account of how rules are formal than he does. For example, I treat in
detail the "internal" formal features of rules: generality, definiteness, completeness, simplicity (complexity), and more. One (but not the only) additional difference is that I treat
empirical generalizations (e.g., "dogs annoy restaurant patrons") as merely one source of
the substantive content for legal rules.
In addition to various articles by the law trained on form, formality, and formalism,
which I have not sought to catalog here, there are articles by persons trained in economic
analysis of relevance to the formal character of law. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis ofRulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Werner Z. Hirsch,
Reducing Law's Uncertainty and Complexity, 21 UCLA L. REv. 1233 (1974); Louis Kaplow,
Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
LAW 27-56 (1996); FULLER, supra, passim; FREDERICK

7

SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE

The subject is a conceptual minefield. See, e.g., DEL VECCHIO, supra note 6, at 113

("No word is understood in so many ways as the word form."); WEBER, supra note 6, at 79
("As everyone knows, there is no expression more ambiguous than the word 'formal' and
no dichotomy more ambiguous than the distinction between form and content.") Some
published accounts of form in the law are also distortions. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 3,
at 355-60 (describing formality as mechanical adherence to rigid rules).
8

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

scombe trans., 1953).

129, at 50 (G.E.M. An-

1997]

HOWLAWIS FORMAL

1171

Wittgenstein also entered a general plea for "insight into what lies in
front of everyone's eyes." 9 In this Article, I seek to identify, to remind
us of, to explicate, and to characterize the familiar so that we may
recognize formality for what it is, understand it more fully, appreciate
it better, and ultimately, give it its due. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once emphasized, what we often need is not "investigation of the obscure," but rather "education in the obvious."' 0
Some, perhaps many, readers will find, in the end, what I characterize as formal in the law to be quite obviously formal. But even for
these perceptive analysts, some of what I say may not be quite so obvious, at least at the outset (and the outset is what Wittgenstein and
Holmes had in mind). In particular, the variety of senses of the word
formal applicable to law may not be quite so obvious. Precisely how
one or more of these senses applies to rules, institutions, and other
legal phenomena may not be quite so obvious. Also, the overall cumulative effect of applying these senses of formal to the phenomena
of law-the aggregate quantum of form in law-may not be quite so
obvious. Further, the extent of credit that should be given to appropriate form in working the law's will may not be quite so obvious. In
addition, the interplay between the formal and the non-formal may
not be quite so obvious. And that form and substance do not exhaust
the ingredients of law may not be quite so obvious.
The overall place of form in the law and the credit to be given it
has not totally escaped all legal theorists. For me, the work of the
great nineteenth-century German thinker, Rudolph von Jhering of
the University of G6ttingen, has been the most suggestive. He saw
that form is grounded in the innermost essence of law ("im innersten
Wesen des Rechts begrfindet'),11 and he appeared to think that form
can be found all over the law.12 Although he did not develop these
theses, he was right. Of course, if form is "grounded in the innermost
essence of law" and if form is to be found all over the law, this will
embarrass those legal theorists who are extreme substantivists. These
theorists use the words "form" and "formal" pejoratively, and find littie place for appropriate form in the law. But law's formal character
ought not to trouble the moderate substantivist who insists merely on
seeing that substance gets its due. Appropriate form and due substance can and should co-exist (though even these together are by no
means enough for law to exist, let alone work its will).

9

LUDWIG WrTrGENSTEIN, VERMISCHTE BERMERKUNGEN 121 (1977) (translation my

own).

10
11
12

OLVER WENDELL HoLmEs, JiL, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 292 (1921).
supra note 6, at 479 (translation my own).
SeeJHERING, LAW AS A MEANS, supra note 6, at 230-325.

JHERING, GEIST,
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In this Article, I try to give due credit to form (1) by introducing,
mainly from general English usage of the words "form" and "formal,"' 3 a stock of concepts that may be used faithfully to represent or
portray the major varieties of form in the phenomena of Western
legal systems; (2) by introducing a uniform and felicitous nomenclature for designating and articulating these concepts of form; and (3)
by demonstrating, albeit only suggestively, the jurisprudential and
practical significance of the varieties of form in the law. In demonstrating the significance of form, I also emphasize that appropriate
form must be distinguished from inappropriate form, that appropriate form should not, even in the course of its application, generally
collapse into something else, such as "substance," or "policy," or "equity;" and that issues of appropriate form pose many significant
choices in legal ordering, ones that implicate fundamental political
values, basic policies, general legal values, equitable considerations,
private preferences, and more. Thus, my general theory of form in
the law may be said to be prescriptive and normative in its implications, as well as conceptual and descriptive. The theory provides concepts and terminology for the perspicuous representation of the
varieties and complexities of form in positive law and other legal phenomena, and provides concepts and terminology for the jurisprudential characterization of law's basic nature as formal (a characterization
that rests on more than merely an aggregation of the varieties of form
in law). The theory also identifies the main types of choices of appropriate form, the types of considerations relevant thereto, and standards for the evaluation of form. Jurisprudentially, the theory exposes
13 Although I have consulted several dictionaries, including historical and etymological dictionaries, I rely mainly on the OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED] and WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993) [hereinafter

Of course, the latter draws to some extent on the former. It is enough for my
present purposes to consult only usages in the English language. These dictionaries represent the best of British and American lexicographic scholarship. Such dictionaries indicate
how the linguistic community generally understands the use of words such as "form" and
"formal." (Both dictionaries record non-pejorative uses of "form" and "formal" ahead of
pejorative ones.) See 6 OED supra, at 78-83; WEBSTER'S, supra, at 892-93. One well-known
defense of my extensive reliance here on general usage is as follows:
[O]ur common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have
found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking,
in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably
practical matters, than any you and I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs
of an afternoon-the most favored alternative method.
...When we examine what we should say when, what words we should
use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words (or 'meanings' whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk
about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena.
JOHN L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 130 (J.O. Urmson & GJ. Warnock eds., 1961).
WEBSTER'S].
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the intimate relations between form and values in a system of law, and
gives due credit to form in the law, overall. My effort here, however, is
only a preliminary one. A book will follow in which I develop my theory more fully. In that work, I will also expound the view that appropriate form is hardly enough, for a functioning system of law is
necessarily a fusion of many varieties of form with policy and other
value content, with trained personnel, with material resources, and
with much else.
I
How LAw IS FoRMAL
I use the word "law" to include rules and other precepts, and also
legal devices such as particular rulings and orders. I also use "law" to
encompass all the basic functional elements in a legal system that together provide for the creation and implementation of law. These
basic functional elements include elections, legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, the institutions of private law, and state sanctioning processes. Such elements also include criteria of validity;
bodies of state-made law; privately made creations such as contracts,
wills, and property arrangements; interpretive methodologies; a precedent system; and recognized entities such as the state, corporations,
business and other associations, ordinary legal persons, and a legal
profession. Further, I use "law" to refer to the legal system as a whole,
which includes its basic functional elements; its general operational
techniques which systematically order, integrate, and coordinate these
basic functional elements; its system-wide principles of legality securing the rule of law; its systematic ranking of sources of valid law,
whereby constitutional law is prioritized over all other law, statute law
over merely judge made law, and so on. As I will explain, the varieties
of form, the choices involved, and the values at stake vary somewhat
depending on whether the object of study consists of rules or the like,
of basic functional elements such as a legislature or a court, or of the
system taken as a whole.
A.

The Formal Character of Rules

Rules are of special importance. Rules are the primary means we
use to prescribe the internal organizational features and subject matter of basic functional elements for creating and implementing law.
As I have said, these basic elements include electoral processes, legislatures, courts, and interpretive methodologies. Thus, rules provide for
and limit legislative, judicial, and executive authority. Rules also provide for and limit the powers of private persons and entities to enter
and enforce contracts, to make wills, and to acquire property. Rules
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also specify criteria of valid law, define and regulate interpretive
method, govern the imposition of sanctions, and more.
Rules are the main legal instruments for authoritative embodiment not merely of essential civic policies such as community peace,
order and safety, but of all kinds of problem-specific policies ranging
from the reinforcement of the family, to facilitation of traffic flow, to
regulation of food and drugs, and so on. Rules are also the principal
means of authoritatively incorporating into the system such fundamental political values as legitimate authority, interpersonal justice,
and basic freedoms, which include not merely political freedom but
freedom to enter contracts, to own property, to make wills, to form
associations for business and other purposes, and more. Further, we
use rules to incorporate such general legal values as certainty and predictability, the dignity and efficiency of citizen self-direction under
law, equality before the law, freedom from official arbitrariness, dispute avoidance, dispute settlement, and various other "rule of law"
values. We use rules not merely to authoritatively incorporate all of
the foregoing types of policies and values. We also devise and utilize
many auxiliary rules to implement the authoritative policies and val14
ues so incorporated.
Moreover, when we turn to a legal system as a whole, we find
heavy reliance on rules to organize, integrate, and coordinate basic
functional elements into general operational techniques for the creation and implementation of state-made law, and of privately-created
law such as contracts and wills. Thus, we typically use rules to incorporate basic functional elements into one or more of five general operational techniques for making and implementing law, namely: the
penal, the grievance-remedial, the administrative-regulatory, the public-benefit conferral, and the private-ordering (on which, more later).
Furthermore, in system-wide perspective, rules figure prominently in
the definition and implementation of those principles of legality and
the rule of law that we deploy to regulate and police the workings of
the foregoing five general operational techniques and the legal system
as a whole. Indeed, the rule of law is largely a law of rules.
What are legal rules? There are many varieties of such rules in
any functioning legal system. Of most, perhaps of nearly all such
rules, we can say the following:
(1) they have content;
(2) are prescriptive raiher than hortatory, or merely descriptive;
(3) directly or indirectly prescribe action and thereby prohibit, permit, or require such action (deontic modalities);
14

See

SUMMERS,

supra note 4, at 195.
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(4) are designed directly or indirectly to serve substantive policy or
to serve fundamental political values or general legal values, or rule
of law values, or private preferences, or equity (or one or more of
these types of ends at the same time);
(5) are based directly or indirectly either on an empirical generalization implying a causal relation between means and ends, or on a
theory about how law can organize and facilitate some end such as
the election and accountability of political leaders, or on a general
moral or social principle, or on a conception of the essential form
or the otherwise appropriate form of an institution, process,
method, or the like;
(6) are expressed in a form that prescribes content as above, and
exhibits a degree of generality, of completeness, and of
definiteness;
(7) are simple or complex (or something in between);
(8) are embodied in some authoritative encapsulatory form, be it
statutory, an administrative regulation, a common law form, a contractual form, or some other recognized authoritative form;
(9) are usually expressed relatively explicitly and in writing at least
if the rule is a state-made rule;
(10) are expressed in a common language of the system;
(11) can usually be found recorded in official books or other
sources.
How are rules formal? I propose throughout this Article to use
the word "formal" in accord with standard English usage, rather than
merely with some personal theory of what might be formal. Thus, I
claim that all the concepts of "formal" that I invoke here are wellgrounded in English usage (though I do not claim that every application I make of "formal" to legal phenomena is itself established English usage.) It follows that what I designate here as formal is not,
conceptually, my own invention. I use "formal" as an adjective in the
English language, and as an adjective, it is largely an expression that
derives its meanings from the noun forms of the word "form" recognized in English. I will now introduce five such meanings of "formal."
I would formulate the first standard meaning of "formal" as follows:
"pertaining to the form or consfitutive essence of a thing."15 I call this
"essential form." Every thing or idea has to take some relatively constant form to be a thing or idea of that type. Thus, a rule, to be a legal
rule, must be prescriptive, as above, and be sufficiently general, complete, and definite. Plato identified all of these features, and singled
out definiteness for special emphasis: "[U]nless you are definite, you

15 6 OED, supranote 13, at 82 (quoting entry for "formal" no. A.l.a). See WEBSTE'S,
supra note 13, at 893 (entry for "formal" no. L.a.).
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must not suppose you are speaking a language that can become
law." 16 (A broad grant of discretion can, of course, be law.)
Prescriptiveness, and minimal degrees of generality, completeness, and definiteness, then, are defining features of a rule, and so,
formal in the above sense. Each feature is different from the others, is
independently significant, and can be analyzed on its own (and in relation to the others) in some depth. Moreover, each serves or can be
designed to serve, severally or conjointly, significant policies or values.
Thus, ordinary legal rules are, first of all, formal insofar as their
defining features are present, that is, insofar as they take what I call at
least the minimum essential form of legal rules. It might be objected
that this is only to say that such rules are rules, a mere tautology,
empty of all significance. But if this be a tautology (which it is not),
then it is one worthy of explicit formulation. A totally formless
"rule"-one that fails to prescribe, one that is totally incomplete, or
totally indefinite, or totally particular-would not be a rule. An extended analysis here would further our understanding of the essential
form of legal rules, of their defining features, of the types of policies
and values these features may serve, and of how appropriately formal
features shape the form and content of rules in the course of their
creation. 17 When I say the formal features of rules shape the form
and content of rules, what I mean can be readily understood if we
imagine varying formulations of a rule having the same general subject matter, such as the regulation of speed on highways. For example, a higher degree of the formal feature of definiteness in such a
rule shapes the form and content of the rule differently from a lower
degree. A 65 mph rule shapes form and content differently than a
"drive reasonably" rule.
When we say that a given rule is formal, we often mean something more than that it merely conforms to the minimum essential
form of a rule, i.e., more than that the rule is just barely over the
definitional threshold of "ruleness." Often we mean that the rule is
appropriately formal, that is, appropriately prescriptive and appropriately general, complete, and definite, given its subject matter and the
policies and values to be served. When we mean by "formal" that the
rule is appropriately formal, we are not saying that the rule is formal
in a second sense wholly independent of essential form. Appropriate
form generally presupposes minimum essential form.
Appropriate form often goes far beyond minimum essential form,
and the scope for elaboration and variation to achieve appropriately
16 2 THE DiALoGuEs OF PLATO 491 (B. Jowett trans., 1937). Aristotle, too, identified
all of these formal features. See, e.g., THE BAsIc WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1326 (Richard McKeon trans., 1941).
17 In my book in process, I have separate chapters on each such feature.
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formal features is often considerable, depending on the nature of the
form involved, the subject matter, and the policies and values at stake.
These elaborations and variations may show themselves in further degrees of generality, completeness, and definiteness that are simply
continuous with these defining features. For example, the policy to
be served by a rule often requires a much higher degree of generality
than merely that which is minimally necessary for it, conceptually, to
be a rule at all. Or it may be that a degree of definiteness, a major
formal feature itself defining in nature, must go well beyond that minimum merely required for ruleness, if the rule is appropriately tailored to serve its ends.
The features of essential form, and of any extra-essential form
continuous with essential form and thus beyond its threshold requirements, are formal in a second sense of the word, well recognized in
another commonly used noun variant of "form" in the English language, namely structure. "Formal" in our language thus also has a
second meaning that I would formulate as follows: "of or pertaining to
structure."' 8 I would then formulate the meaning of structure as follows: "the way a part or parts of a whole is organized."' 9 Thus, alternative formulations of a rule may display differing prescriptive
modalities (duties, prohibitions, powers, etc.), differing degrees of
generality, differing degrees of completeness, and differing degrees of
definiteness. Definiteness of a given degree, for example, contributes
in its own way to how the parts of a whole rule are put together. It is
not merely an ingredient or part of the rule (like policy); it is also a
way of organizing the parts of the rule. It follows that definiteness in a
rule is formal not only because it is a defining feature, i.e., not only
because it pertains to the essential form of a rule. Definiteness is also
formal because it is structural. It is a feature that contributes to, and
so structures, the overall form and content of a rule. Such a feature
then, is formal both in the sense of being a defining feature of the
essential form of a rule, and formal also in the sense of contributing
to the structure of the rule-to how it is organized. Thus, definiteness
18 "The particular character, nature, structure, or constitution of a thing .... ." 6
OED, supra note 18, at 78 (entry for "form" no. 1.5.a). "[T]he shape and structure of
something as distinguished from the material of which it is composed." WEBSTER'S, supra
note 13, at 892 (entry for "form" no. 2.a.). In OED, both completeness and definiteness are
specifically recognized as formal. See 6 OED, supra note 18, at 82 (entries for "formal" nos.
3.b & 5).
19 "Manner of building or construction; the way in which an edifice, machine, implement, etc. is made or put together." 16 OED, supra note 13, at 959 (entry for "structure"
no. 2). See also entry no. 8 for "structure." "The mutual relation of the constituent parts
or elements of a whole as determining its peculiar nature or character; make, frame." Id.
In entry no. 3.d for "structure," OED notes that this applies to linguistic phenomena, too.
See id. Webster's entry no. 3 for structure is: "the manner of construction: the way in which
the parts of something are put together or organized." WEBsrER'S, supra note 13, at 2267.
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is nonetheless structural for also being defining. When the structural
feature of definiteness, though continuous with the minimum definiteness required for essential form, is elaborated beyond that minimum, we should still say that this extra-essential degree of definiteness
is also formal in the second sense, i.e., "structurally formal." That is,
the degree of definiteness contributes to the structure of the rule-to
the way in which the parts of the rule are organized. Generality is thus
structural, too. So is completeness. As I have said, there is great scope
for elaboration and variation here beyond the definiteness, generality
and completeness required for the minimal essential form of a rule.
Indeed, the formal features of rules typically go beyond the requirements of minimal essential form. Such features just are, up to their
threshold of minimum "essential form," formal in essential form and
also formal in how they contribute to the structure of the rule, and
beyond that threshold, are formal merely in the sense of structural.
There are still other major varieties of form which are not at all
continuous with features of the essential form of rules. For example,
all rules exhibit another feature of form and content, namely that of
being either simple, not so simple, somewhat complex, or very complex. The appropriate degree of simplicity or complexity of a rule is
affected at least by its degrees of generality, completeness, and definiteness, by variations in its subject-matter content and by the policies
and values at stake. This feature of simplicity (or complexity) is also
structurally formal. 20 For example, a decrease in the complexity of a
rule must show itself in content, and may also show itself in effects on
other formal features such as definiteness or generality or completeness. It then becomes appropriate to say that the relations between
form and content in the rule have changed-its structure has
changed. The feature of simplicity (or complexity) is a structural feature. The degree of simplicity or complexity of a rule is not, however,
continuous with any defining feature of a rule, and is thus structurally
formal quite independently of the defining features of the essential
form of a rule.
There is a third major sense of "formal" that is also not continuous with any feature of the essential form of rules. All rules are what I
call "expressionally formal" in varying degrees. I formulate this meaning of "formal" as follows: "of or pertaining to mode of expression. '21
The mode of expression of a rule encompasses:
20
21

See supra note 19.

Thus, OED entry no. 1.9 for "form" as a noun provides: "Style of expressing the
thoughts and ideas in literary or musical composition, including the arrangement and order of the different parts of the whole." 6 OED, supra note 13, at 79. See also id. at 82
(entries A.l.c & A-5 for "formal"). Webster's definition for "form" as a noun includes references to "style," method of expression, and "orderly arrangement." WEBSTER's, supra note
13, at 892 (quoting entries 4.a & 10.a).
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(1) the extent of its explicitness;

(2) the extent it is set forth in writing;
(3) the extent it is set forth in a technical or other specialized vocabulary; and
(4) the extent it is formulated with compactness and organizational
rigor.
The appropriate mode of expression of a rule may be highly formal or
less formal or even informal, depending on the subject matter and the
policies and values at stake. Again, the degree of expressional formality of a rule is not a feature that is continuous with prescriptiveness of
content, generality, definiteness or completeness. Thus, it is quite independent of the essential form of a rule. It is also not the same as
structural form.
Yet a fourth major sense of "formal" is also one that is not continuous with any feature of the essential form of rules. This fourth sense
derives from the fact that all legal rules are set forth in some recognized legal form or mould. Thus, all legal rules are set forth either in:
constitutional law, or statutory law, or judge-made law, or customary
law, etc. I call this familiar concept encapsulatory form. "Formal," in
reference to this type of feature, means something like: "of or pertain22
ing to mode of encapsulation."
So far I have considered the formal character of rules in terms of
their essential form, of their continuous "extra-essential" form that is
structural, their non-continuous extra-essential form that is structural,
and of further varieties of form that are expressional and encapsulatory. In this, I have treated the prescriptive nature of the content of
22 One OED entry for the adjective "formal" provides in part: "pertaining to the form,
arrangement, external qualities (e.g., of a work of art, a composition, etc.)." 6 OED supra
note 13, at 82 (entry no. A.l.c). Another OED entry for the adjective "formal" provides in
part: "Done or made with the forms recognized as ensuring validity...." Id. (entry no.
A.5). The OED entry for the noun "form" provides "One of the different modes in which a
thing exists or manifests itself; a species, kind, or variety." Id. at 78 (entry no. 5.b). Webster's offers an entry for the adjective "formal" that provides: "relating to, concerned with,
or constituting the outward form, superficial qualities, or arrangement of something as
distinguished from its content." WEBSrER'S, supra note 13, at 893 (entry no. L.b).
Roscoe Pound, following the practice of E.G. Clark and noting that the expression has
come into "more or less general use," refers to the variety of encapsulatory forms in which
rules and other legal precepts may exist as " ' forms of law.'" 3 RoscoE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 382 (1959) (quoting E.G. CLARK, PRACrICALJURISPRUDENCE 198-99 (1883)). Pound
describes these "'forms of law'" as: "the literary shapes in which legal precepts and doctrines are authoritatively expressed, the authoritative forms of expression to which courts
are referred in the decision of controversies and to which counselors must resort for the
bases of prediction when called on to advise." I& at 383. Pound notes that what I call the
encapsulatory forms of legal precepts may be divided generally into three categories: "In
general, they may be classified as (1) legislation; (2) case law, i.e., law expressed in the
form ofjudicial decisions of past controversies; and (3) text book law, i.e., law expressed
authoritatively in juristic writings." Id. at 416. Of course, a more extended typology is
possible. (I am indebted to Professor Peter Mfiller-Graff for suggesting the name
"encapsulatory.")
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rules as a feature of the essential form of rules. So far, I have not
focused on the subject-matter content of rules. There is still a fifth
major sense of "formal" recognized in our language that is relevant
here and one might formulate it as follows: "of or pertaining to organization, procedure, technique or methodology. ' 23 I call this "organizational form." In this fifth sense, the subject-matter content of many
types of legal rules is formal. Indeed, all the rules that prescribe features of such basic functional elements of a legal system as elections,
legislatures, courts, administrative bodies, and methods of interpretation, are formal in subject-matter content. This is also true of all rules
that specify the methodical and the unifying features of a legal system
and its operations as a whole. Likewise, any rules which prescribe the
structural, expressional, or encapsulatory form of other rules are also
formal in content. For example, a constitutional rule prescribing a
high degree of definiteness in criminal statutes is formal in content.
All the foregoing varieties of form reveal and reflect numerous
types of choices of design in the formality of a rule. The policies and
values at stake in such choices are varied and significant.
To summarize, all legal rules are formal in that they:
(1) exhibit at least the defining features of the essentialform of rules,
including especially
-prescriptive content,
-minimum generality,
-minimum completeness, and
-minimum definiteness;
(2) exhibit features of structuralform either within, or beyond, mini-

mum defining prescriptiveness, generality, completeness, and definiteness continuous with those defining features, and exhibit
structural form in non-continuous features such as simplicity or
complexity;
(3) exhibit features of expressionalform;
(4) exhibit features of encapsulatoryform; and
(5) in some rules, exhibit form that prescribes the organizational
form-organizational formality of content-of basic functional elements such as elections, legislatures, courts, criteria of validity, inter-

pretive methodology, or of organizational aspects of the system as a
whole, or prescribe features of structural, expressional, or encapsulatory form.
23
The OED entry for "form" as a noun provides the following- "Due shape, proper
figure; orderly arrangement of parts, regularity, good order ... ," 6 OED, supra note 13, at
79 (entry no. 1.8); "Manner method, way, fashion (of doing anything)," i. (entry no. 1.10);
and, "A set, customary, or prescribed way of doing anything; a set method of procedure
according to rule (e.g., at law); formal procedure," id (entries I.11.a & b). See also the OED
entry 4.a for "formal": "Regular, having a definite principle, methodical." Id. at 82. Webster's entry for "form" at 4.b provides: "established method of expression or practice: fixed
or formal way of proceeding. . . ." WEBS-rER'S, supra note 13, at 892.
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The foregoing scheme of concepts, distinctions, and nomenclature affords a relatively comprehensive basis for analyzing the formal
character of rules, and for identifying significant choices of form in
the construction of rules. It also affords a basis for the systematic and
stable use of the concept of a "highly formal rule." Indeed, the most
formal rule might be analyzed as one that exhibits high degrees of
structural features that are defining or continuous with defining features; exhibits a high degree of structural complexity; exhibits a high
degree of expressional form; exhibits canonical encapsulatory form;
and incorporates subject-matter content that is. itself formal, i.e.,
organizational.
A critic might object that the foregoing varieties of the formal are
all my own invention. But the above five senses of formal-essentially
formal, structurally formal, expressionally formal, encapsulatorily formal, and organizational formality of content-are all rooted in standard English usage of the words form, formal, and their derivatives. It
is true that some of my applications of concepts of form and formal to
legal phenomena may not themselves be established uses of these
words. For example, we do not ordinarily refer to the mode of encapsulation of legal content as formal (let alone use the word "encapsulatory" in this way). But this does not mean that the relevant legal
phenomena do not answer to the relevant concept or concepts of the
formal. They do, as I have demonstrated.
A critic might also object that the five senses of formal have
"nothing in common." But there is no inconsistency between them,
and each coheres with the others. Moreover, it is not necessary that
these usages have anything in common. Each except the last (organizational formality of content) applies to all rules. Each except the last
is a common "golden thread"-a standard understanding of the word
"formal" applicable to all rules. I am not claiming that each of the
four types of "golden threads"-each standard meaning of formalapplies to the same facet of each rule. While it is true that essential
form and structural form do, to some extent, pertain to the same facet
of rules, expressional form, encapsulatory form, and organizational
formality of content pertain to their own relatively distinct facets:
mode of expression, mode of encapsulation, and any organizational
content. In sum, there are always at least four "golden threads" here,
running through all rules, and these establish that form pervades
rules. It would be an objection to my thesis if some rules were formal
only in the sense of essential form, other rules only in the sense of
structural form, still other rules only in the sense of encapsulatory
form, and so on. If that were so, my thesis would rest on equivocations. But this is not the case.
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A critic might also object that my analysis proves too much. It
might be said that since my analysis indicates rules are far more formal, in perfectly intelligible and well-recognized senses of the word,
than at least American theorists have heretofore generally assumed,
the analysis leaves no place at all, or very little place, for the nonformal in rules, and is therefore very largely a vacuous thesis devoid of
contrast and rebuttability. But it is not true that my analysis leaves no
place for the non-formal in rules. First, any subject-matter content of
rules that does not itself prescribe organizational or other formal features is not formal. This means that a great many rules have content
that is not formal. Foremost among these are rules with problem-specific policy content. Then there are still other facets of rules that are
obviously not formal in any of the senses used here. The particular
natural language in which the rules are expressed is not formal in the
senses explicated here. Nor are the authoritative books and other repositories in which rules are set forth formal. Moreover, rules are not
the whole of the law, and much of the remainder is not formal,
though it is intimately concerned with the creation and implementation of rules. Essential social acceptance of law is not. Trained personnel are not. Material resources are not.
Finally, a critic might object that my analysis fatally omits the negative or contrastive meanings that "form" and "formal" have in our
language, and that these are the true meanings of these terms. One
possible thesis here might be that form and formal are entirely parasitic for their meanings on negative contrasts with the other side of a
dichotomy-with whatever they are used to negate or rule out on particular occasions, such as substantive policy content, or justice and equity in a particular case, and so on.24 Thus, on such a view, the
meaning of formal in regard to a rule is essentially negative-is merely
whatever is not substantive policy content, for example. But each of
the five senses of formal taken here from standard English usage is, on
my analysis, affirmative or positive in meaning. A formal feature is
affirmative or positive in the sense I intend if it is actually present, as
distinguished from merely lacking or failing to express an opposed
quality, such as policy content. Whatever is formal in any one of the
foregoing five senses exists apart from, and can be characterized independently of, any relation of negation or contrast that it may have
with an "opposite" such as substantive policy or the like. Thus, form
and formal in the five senses I have identified are not parasitic on any
contrast with opposites. They have affirmative or positive meanings of
their own. Consider a feature of what I call essential form-a degree
of generality. This feature is affirmatively present in a rule. It is not a
24 It is true that some words are best understood as excluders. SeeJ. AUSTIN, SENSE
AND SENSIBILIA 70-71 (G-J. Warnock ed., 1962).
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feature that merely lacks or fails to express the opposed quality of
particularity. (The same is true of generality as a structural feature of
a rule.) Similarly, the degree to which a rule is set forth in writing, a
feature of what I call expressional form, is something actually present.
It is not a feature that merely lacks or fails to express the opposed
quality of not being in writing. The same is true of encapsulatory
form and of organizational form, mutatis mutandis.
A closing caveat is in order. When the formal features of a rule
are well drafted and are enshrined in written form-even in constitutional or statutory forms, it still does not follow that subsequent practice under these seemingly "fixed" forms cannot effectively alter the
degree or level of any of the varieties of form in such rules. Here we
know that there may even be considerable divergence between law in
books and law in action, especially if there is a highly activistjudiciary.
B.

The Formal Character of Basic Functional Elements Within a
Legal System

Rules alone are not enough. Plainly, they cannot create themselves. They cannot qualify themselves as authoritative. They cannot
apply themselves. They cannot enforce themselves. Nor can they
serve in place of rulings, principles, orders, maxims, nor in place of
other species of law such as private contracts, wills, and property arrangements not reducible to rules.
As I have indicated, an operational system of law requires authoritative institutions and processes by which representatives of the state
may make, apply and enforce law. It also requires authoritative arrangements by which private parties and officials may make and carry
out contracts and wills, create and transfer property, and more. A
system of law also requires interpretive and other methodologies for
applying state-made, and privately created, forms of law to particular
states of fact. This list is by no means exhaustive. Such elements of a
legal system I call "basic functional elements," and when operational,
these elements also utilize official and other personnel, a common
language, material resources, and more. An extended categorization
of such elements in a modem system of law would include:
(1) electoral processes;
(2) a legislature;
(3) courts and a court system;
(4) administrative hierarchies;
(5) institutions and processes for the creation and administration
of law by private parties and entities;
(6) public and private entities such as the state, corporations, partnerships, private persons with legal capacity, etc.;
(7) interpretive methodologies for state-made law and for privately

created forms of law;
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(8) a body of constitutional law, including criteria for determining
the validity of law;
(9) a body of state-made substantive law;
(10) a body of state-made procedural law;
(11) a body of evidentiary law;
(12) a sanctioning system;
(13) mechanisms and devices for recruiting and assigning personnel to roles in the system; and
(14) a legal profession.
Each of the foregoing basic functional elements is more or less
discrete in its own way. Each element has a special function, or functions, within the system as a whole. In addition, each is internally organized to fulfill that function or functions. Each presupposes other
such elements, and, within an operational system, each is integrated
and coordinated with certain other elements in one or more basic
ways, as we will see.
Some of the basic functional elements of a legal system are highly
complex. Among the most complex are certain legal institutions such
as legislatures, courts, and administrative hierarchies. These institutional elements have organized functions. They have organized differentiation, specialization and centralization of roles. They have
organized procedures, organized supervisory and other hierarchies,
organized selection of personnel, and more. A well-organized legal
institution effectively organizes who is to do what, when, where, and
how, all in order to discharge the essential functions of that institution. An institution just is an organ that is organized in a variety of
dimensions. Legal rules are the principal social device for designing
and organizing a legal institution, and indeed, for designing and organizing any basic functional element of a legal system. Valid legal
rules not only specify and prescribe the features and subject matter of
such a basic functional element, but most importantly of all, express
the initial authoritative understanding of the system as to the specific
nature of the element. Thomas Hobbes was among the first to stress
the role of rules here: "The skill of making, and maintaining commonwealths, consisteth in certain rules . . . not ... on practice only
"25

Yet, institutions, processes, methodologies, entities, and other basic functional elements of law cannot be reduced to rules. These elements consist of far more than the rules used to organize them. In
developed systems, we use rules to organize institutions and other basic functional elements of the system in the first instance. The resulting institution or other element, however, does not itself consist of
those rules, and its features and subject matter, as an "up and run25

THoMAS HOBBES, LF-viATHAN 136 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1960).
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ning" element, are not the features and subject matter of the rules
organizing it. Institutions and other functional elements have features and subject matter of their own, quite apart from the rules that
prescribe such features and subject matter. Also, the features and subject matter of institutions and other basic elements of law, once "up
and running," frequently thereafter diverge somewhat from the prescriptions in their organizing rules. This is one type of divergence
between law in books and law in action. Such "divergence gaps" may
be wide or narrow, depending partly on how effectively the rules and
other machinery can be invoked to close such gaps. But the very reality of such gaps is still another reason why institutions and other basic
functional elements cannot be reduced to rules. Moreover, institutions and other elements of a system of law require far more than ruleprescribed modes of organization to exist as functional social phenomena. They require general social acceptance for their very existence and operation; trained personnel; specialized knowledge; a
common language; material resources; and still more if they are to
function at all. And these social assets, too, can hardly be reduced to
rules. Yet, without rules systematically organizing the legal uses of
these social assets, basic functional elements as we know them simply
would not exist.
How are the basic functional elements of a legal system formal?
For now, I will treat illustratively, and in abbreviated fashion, how only
three types of such elements are formal: namely a legislature, courts,
and an interpretive methodology for statutes. Legislatures and courts
are institutional in character, whereas methodology is not.
A system of law in a modem Western society would be fundamentally defective without a legislative body as a basic functional element
of the system. Some such body must exist with legitimate power to
make general written law ordering human relations in advance. Accordingly, the composition, powers, and procedures of a legislature
are a focus of natural legal concern in a society to be ruled by law.
A legislature is not formless. It is, first of all, formal in the sense
that it conforms in some degree to the minimum essential form of a
legislature. This minimal form varies somewhat from society to society. 26 In most developed Western societies, the legislature is:
(1) a representative body;
(2) with power to make general and prospective written law for the
whole society (though this may require concurrence of an
executive);
(3) with power to make law which takes priority over all other law
except constitutional law;
26 Here, "formal" is used in the sense "of or pertaining to essence." See supra note 15
and accompanying text.
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(4) and which has a procedure generally designed to bring facts,
reason, and public opinion to bear on proposed laws;
(5) and has voting and other procedures that enable it to resolve
differences over proposed laws.
I do not claim that these are universal defining features of all
legislatures-a universal essential legislative form. But for my purposes, the foregoing is sufficient to identify a "noun foundation" of
minimal essential form for the corresponding adjectival expression
"formal," as applied to legislatures. Any developed society has at least
some such minimal conception of the defining features of a legislature-of its essential form, though that conception is not identical for
all such societies. When it is said that a legislature is formal, one sense
of "formal" that may be meant, then, is simply that what is referred to
conforms to the prevailing minimal conception of essential legislative
form, whatever that conception for the particular society happens to
be.
The accepted appropriate form of a legislature in a given society
may, and commonly does, go beyond what is required by the minimal
essential form for a legislature. That is, what is accepted as the appropriate form of a legislature commonly includes elaborations and variations that go beyond its minimal defining features. As I will explain,
these elaborations and variations in the name of appropriate form are
themselves formal in further major senses fully recognized in our language. Of course, these elaborations and variations likewise differ
from system to system. Conceptions of the overall appropriate form
of a legislature probably differ between Western systems more than do
conceptions of minimal essential form. An account of the main ways
in which a legislature is formal in Western systems requires that we go
beyond "formal" in the sense of "essential form."
Some of the formal elaborations and variations that go beyond
the essential form of a legislature are continuous with one or more
defining features of the essential form of a legislature as sketched
here. That is, they are continuous at least in the sense that they consist of further auxiliary rules and other devices designed to secure
these very features. For example, the defining feature of a legislative
procedure designed to secure rational deliberation on legislative proposals may be quite elaborate, and may vary significantly from system
to system. A given legal system may, for valid enactment of a statute,
require merely a majority vote of a single chamber favoring a bill after
being through only a single "reading" before the legislature. But another system may go well beyond this, and require not only several
"readings" of a proposed law at periodical intervals but also require
public hearings, and require a committee report supporting the final
version of the bill to be voted on. Whether or not continuous with
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any defining features, at least some of these elaborations and variations that go beyond minimal essential form are formal in a second
major sense also fully recognized in our language. That is, they are
formal simply in the sense that they are procedural. They pertain to
the well-established noun meaning of form, which we may formulate
as: "manner, method, or style of proceeding." 27 I will call this procedural form. Of course, insofar as such procedural features of a legisla-"
ture are also defining features, they are formal in two senses at the
same time: formal in the sense of conforming to minimal essential
form, and formal in the sense of procedural.
Some of the defining features and some elaborations and variations on the essential form of a legislature are formal in a third wellrecognized sense of the word, namely, "of or pertaining to structure,"28 where what structure means is itself formulated as follows:
"the way a part or parts of a whole is organized." 29 The organizational
framework of a legislature is structural. For example, its structure may
include one chamber or two chambers. Again, that a legislature must
have at least one chamber is also formal in the sense that this feature
is a defining feature which pertains to the essential form of a legislature as well. Beyond the number of chambers, there are other features of the organizational framework of a legislature, too, such as
differentiation of official roles within the legislature, any committee
system, relationships between the legislature and the executive, and
the extent to which legislative power overall is centralized in a single
body for the whole society instead of "federally" shared.
An institution such as a legislature may also be described in terms
of its overall definitiveness. Thus, its composition, structure, and procedures may be tightly organized and operate in a highly regularized
fashion. The more so, the more definitive; the less so, the less definitive. The overall definitiveness of the organization and mode of operation of a legislature is a fourth type of formal feature of such an
institution. This sense of formal derives from an established usage of
"form" which may be phrased as follows: "fixed, orderly, and clear in
outline."3 0 The factors that most affect the definitiveness of an institution such as a legislature include the precision of its organizational
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
29 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
30
OED entry no. 1.8 for the noun "form," provides: "Due shape, proper figure; orderly
arrangements of parts, regularity, good order...." See supra note 23. See also OED entry
no. 1.11.a. for "form": "A set, customary, or prescribed way of doing anything .... " See
supra note 23. Webster's entry no. 4.b for the noun "form" says: "fixed or formal way of
proceeding," WEBSmR's, supra note 13, at 892, and at entry 10.a: "orderly arrangement or
method of arrangement," i& Under synonyms, Webster's states that "Form may suggest an
appearance in which both clear outline and also structure and orderly disposition of details are presented or suggested." Id
27
28
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design; the faithful prescription of that design in rules; and the readiness of legislators, judges, officials, and affected parties to criticize departures from those rules and to take action to remedy or counter
31
such departures.
A fifth meaning of formal as applied to a legislature or other institution is simply arranged or fixed "according to rule."3 2 The various

dimensions of a legislature are, in varying degrees, arranged or fixed
according to rule, and so are what I will call "preceptually" formal.
Moreover, these rules are also formal in that they display all of the
varieties of formality already addressed here in my discussion of the
formality of rules, including their structural, expressional, and encapsulatory formality.
In sum, a legislature is formal (1) in terms of those of its features
that are defining, i.e., that pertain to its essential form; (2) in procedural terms; (3) in structural terms; (4) in definitiveness; and (5) in
being fixed according to rule. A critic might ask: Is there anything
about a functioning legislature that is not formal? My thesis is not
vacuous. Many things about a legislature are not formal, including
most obviously, its actual acceptance in the society as a law-making
institution, the personnel elected to the legislature, the material resources they utilize, the language they utilize, the knowledge and expertise they bring to bear, the substantive policy content of proposed
legislation, and more. Of course, such non-formal social assets are
duly organized within an operating legislature partly through the use
of rules and other formal devices.
I now turn to courts, mainly trial courts, as another basic functional element of a legal system. A system of law without courts would
be fundamentally defective. For a variety of reasons, disputes of law
and of fact are inevitable in any society. The disputing parties cannot
alone resolve all such disputes through negotiation or other means,
even when acting in good faith. Courts are needed to resolve some
proportion of these disputes. No other institution has the impartiality
and objectivity, nor the required procedural apparatus, to resolve
such disputes in accord with law and fact. Accordingly, the design of a
33
court is also a focus of natural legal concern.
See HART, supra note 6, at 56-57, 88-90, 102-03, 115-16.
32 OEDentry no. 1.11.a for the noun "form" states: "a set method of procedure according to rule ....
See supra note 23. The OED entry for "formal" no. A.3.a. provides: "That
is, according to recognized forms, or to the rules of art or law." 6 OED, supra note 13, at
82. Webster's entry no. 4.b for the noun "form" says: "procedure according to rule .... " See
supra note 23. Webster's entry no. 2.a for "formal" reads: "following or according with established form, custom, or rule." WEBSTER'S, supra note 13, at 893. See also entry no. 3.a:
"based on forms and rules." Id.
33 In Anglo-American law, Lon L. Fuller wrote more perceptively about adjudicative
design than anyone else. See ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 90-100, 164 (1984).
31
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A trial court is not formless. It is, first of all, formal in the sense
that it takes the form essential for its existence as a court. That is, it
conforms to the minimum essential form of a court. Again, conceptions of what this is vary somewhat from system to system. In most
Western systems, the essential form for trial courts includes the following features:
(1) provision for an independent and impartial official decision
maker (which may include lay jurors);
(2) provision of some opportunity for each disputing party (with or
without a lawyer) to prepare and present evidence and argument to
the decision maker, and to respond to the other party in the presence of the decision maker;
(3) provision that the decision maker is to decide largely on the
basis of the evidence and argument so presented by the parties;
(4) provision that the decision maker shall have power to enforce
any decision made not only against a party who fully participates, as
above, but also against any party properly notified who refuses to
participate.
The foregoing features of the essential form of a trial court are
designed to fulfill the dispute-resolving function of a court, and to do
so in accord with law and fact, thereby also serving the policies of the
legal rules ultimately applied, general legal values, equitable considerations, any private preferences embodied in a contract or the like, and
other values.
As I have said, the notion of minimal essential form of a trial
court varies somewhat from system to system. But when it is said that a
court is "formal," a primary sense that may be meant is simply that the
institution conforms to the prevailing minimal conception of the essential form of a court for that society, whatever that conception. The
defining features of the essential form of a court, even with the basic
auxiliary rules that secure them to some degree, comprise no more
than a minimal conception. As instantiated in practice, this minimal
conception could only imperfectly fulfill the function of a court to
resolve disputes in accord with law and fact. Further elaboration is
required.
As we saw with regard to rules and with regard to a legislature, the
accepted appropriate form of a trial court in a given society also usually goes well beyond what is required merely by its defining features
of essential form. That is, the appropriate form of a court typically
includes significant elaborations and variations on the minimal conception. These elaborations and variations are themselves formal in
straightforward ways fully recognized in our language. Again, these
further elaborations and variations that do not pertain to the essential
form of courts are themselves not uniform across Western systems.
Here, conceptions of overall appropriate form probably differ be-
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tween Western systems even more than conceptions of minimal essential form. A full account of the main ways in which a court may be
formal in Western systems requires that we go far beyond the sense of
formal which merely.means the minimal essential form.
Many of the elaborations and variations going beyond essential
form are formal in the further sense that they pertain to procedural
form. Consider, for example, the vast elaborations of court procedures for defining and resolving disputed issues of fact that exist in
many systems. These procedures for preparation and trial of factual
issues are typically extensive and complex. These procedures, though
continuous with, typically go far beyond what would be required
merely to satisfy the minimal requisites of "essential form." These
procedures are formal in the sense that they pertain to the well-established noun meaning of form: "manner, method or style of proceeding.''3 4 Again, insofar as such procedural features of a court are also
defining features, these are formal in two senses at the same time:
formal in the sense of conforming to essential form, and formal in the
sense of procedural.
Furthermore, the essential form of a court requires an independent adjudicator to secure impartiality. Elaborations and variations
here include some that go beyond, yet are continuous with, the essential feature of independence. At least they are continuous in the sense
that they consist of further auxiliary devices that secure this very feature. In all developed systems, judicial impartiality is secured at least
by rules that prohibit outside political interference with judicial decision-making. But some systems have numerous auxiliary rules here,
too. Thus a system may have rules prohibiting the parties from making any contact with the judge except in the presence of the other
party. A system may have rules prohibiting judges from deciding disputes between corporations in which they have a financial interest. A
system may have rules requiring judges to recuse themselves when a
party is a personal acquaintance. Elaborations and variations that
thus secure impartiality through independence of the judge from the
influence of politicians and of parties are formal in the sense of structural. These structural features organize the whole process so to
shield the judge from improper influence. Insofar as these features
are also defining features, they too are formal in two senses at the
same time: formal in the sense of conforming to essential form and
formal in the sense of structural. Still other elaborations and variations of a structural nature are known to Western systems. For example, in American public law litigation,3 5 the party structure may go
34
35

On procedural form, see supra note 23.

See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of theJudge in PublicLaw Litigation,89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281 (1976) (explaining public law litigation).
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well beyond simply two opposing parties or sides. Also, within a court
system as a whole, important features of structure include the degree
of centralization of courts and whether there be one level or two levels
of appeal in the hierarchy. All the foregoing are structural and so
formal. That is, they pertain to "form" in another of its standard
'3 6
meanings, namely "structure.
As we have also seen, the definitiveness of a legal institution introduces still another formal dimension. Thus, a court, like a legislature, may be tightly organized and operate in a highly regular fashion.
Or a court may be loosely organized and operate not so regularly.
The more closely organized and the more regularized its operations,
the more definitive a court is. Overall definitiveness is partly a function of structural and procedural form, though some varieties of structural and procedural form may have little bearing on definitiveness.
The main factors that affect the definitiveness of an institution such as
a court are the precision of its organizational design, the faithful prescription of that design in rules, and the readiness ofjudges, officials
and affected parties to criticize departures from those rules and to
take action to remedy or counter the departures. 3 7 The definitiveness
of an institution is formal in a fully recognized sense of that word,
namely the sense derived from the noun in which "form" means, simply, "fixed, orderly, clear in outline."3 8
Again, a further basic use of formal as applied to an institution
means that it is something "fixed ...according to rule."3 9 A court is
also formal in this way. As I have already indicated, numerous and
elaborate rules define, constitute, and regulate a court. Such institutions, then, may be said to be preceptually formal, that is, significantly
dependent on rules for their contours. All such rules also take some
encapsulatory form, as we have seen. That is, all are encapsulated
either in constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, customary,
or other form.
In sum, a court is formal in terms of those defining features of
form essential to its being a court at all. Beyond that, a court is also an
institution that is elaborately organized in a variety of ways, and these
are formal procedurally, structurally, definitively, and preceptually.
Moreover, the preceptual formality of a court is itself set forth in a
recognized encapsulatory form.
On structural form, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See supranote 31.
On definitive form, see supranote 30 and accompanying text. Definiteness of rule
is different from definitiveness of institutions and processes. Definiteness of rule pertains
to its meaning, whereas definitiveness of institutions and processes pertains to the operational contours thereof. On definiteness of rule see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
39 See supra note 32.
36

37
38
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With all these ways in which a court is formal, a critic might ask
what there is about a functioning court that is not formal? Again, the
formality thesis is not vacuous. Many things about a functioning court
are not formal, including its general social acceptance as an authoritative body, the official personnel and other persons participating in its
processes, the policy content of substantive law that a court applies,
the testimonial and other evidence introduced to establish facts, the
natural language utilized, the material resources deployed, and still
more, all of which are likewise essential to the workings of a court.
All the varieties of form that I have identified here reveal, reflect,
and pose countless choices of design in the formality of legislatures,
courts and other legal institutions. 40 Of course, at any given time,
only a few of these choices will be open. That is, at least the basic
choices of design will have already been made. The values at stake in
such choices are numerous and often fundamental. Well-designed
legislatures serve democracy, rationality in law-making, social policies
of many kinds, the rule of law, and more. Well-designed courts and
court systems function to resolve disputes in accord with law and fact
and thereby serve the policies of the substantive law in issue; rule-oflaw values; process values such as procedural fairness; and general
legal values such as certainty, freedom from official arbitrariness, and
more. Another formal feature that legislatures, courts and other institutions share is this. Legislatures have authority to address proposed
law of highly varied content. Courts of law have authority to resolve
disputes of highly variable content. Similarly, other legal institutions
of public and of private law are set up to deal with matters that are
highly variable in content. This generality of institutional scope is
methodical, another established meaning of the word formal. 41 Each
institution stands ready to apply the same systematic general method
or approach not to a single instance but regularly to many relevantly
similar instances, though highly varied in content. Of course, institutions are specialized as to scope and method. Some make general
written law, some resolve disputes and so on.
I now turn to a third illustrative basic functional element in a
legal system, and consider how it is formal. This element consists of
the interpretive methodology for statutes, an element that, unlike a
legislature and a court, is not institutional in nature. Of course,
courts regularly deploy some such methodology, and insofar as it is
formal, this is a further respect in which we can say that courts, too,
40 On appropriate form, see infra Part III.A.
41
OED entry no. A.4.a for "formal" states: "Regular, having a definite principle,
methodical." 6 OED, supra note 13, at 82. Webster's entry no. 3.b for "formal" states: "characterized by punctilious respect for form: exact, methodical, orderly." WEBsTER'S supra
note 13, at 893.
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are formal. In Western systems, interpretive methodologies for statutes appear to be less formally organized and more variant in features
and subject matter than legislatures and courts. Again, a system of law
without any interpretive methodology for statutes would be fundamentally defective. Issues of statutory interpretation are inevitable
and numerous in any system, all the more so to the extent a system
lacks a sound and coherent interpretive methodology. An interpretive methodology has vast scope for operation. It is not merely that
courts apply it. Administrative officials apply it. Legislators apply it
when creating statutes in the first place. And, above all, citizens apply
it outside of court and beyond official settings when they make decisions in daily life and work. Without a sound and coherent interpretive methodology, life under law would certainly be more disputatious
and more disharmonious. Also, less legislative policy would be served.
Legislators would not know how to draft statutes in the first place.
Different, or even the same, judges would resolve the same issues differently. Citizens and others would not be able to rely sufficiently on
their interpretations from the inception of statutes, and so would frequently be required to guess until courts speak. The rule of law would
flounder. Regularly determinate statutory reasons for action would
not be available. Indeed, statutory rules might in practice come to
lack all prescriptiveness.
A methodology for interpreting statutes is not formless. As with
other basic functional elements such as legislatures and courts, an interpretive methodology is formal in a number of ways. First and foremost, such a methodology is formal in that it conforms to the
minimum essential form required to count as an interpretive methodology at all. 4 2 While there is far from universal agreement in Western
systems on what this essential form is, several general features of operative methodologies of interpretation are widely shared.4 3 Thus,
many such systems explicitly recognize a number of the same basic
types of interpretive arguments. 44 Further, many systems tend to accord the argument from ordinary meaning (and its variant, the argu45
ment from technical meaning) some special weight or primacy.
Nearly all such systems tend to interpret criminal statutes, in certain
types of doubtful cases, favorably to defendants. 4 6 While these defining features fall far short of a developed interpretive methodology,
they can be considered to provide at least a minimal "noun" founda42

See supra note 15.
See generallyD. NEIL MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING STATUTESA COMPARATIVE STUDY (1991) (discussing similarities and differences; for summary see
Chapter 12).
44 See id. at 464-65.
45 See i& at 466.
46 See id. at 559 (providing index entry citing relevant pages).
43
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tion of "essential form" for the adjectival expression "formal," as applied to interpretive method.
In some Western societies, what is generally accepted as the appropriate form of an interpretive methodology goes far beyond the
foregoing minimalist conception, but in other societies, such as the
United States, not nearly so far.4 7 The further elaborations and variations of appropriate form likewise vary from society to society. It is
possible to sketch a model that captures most of the directions which
many such further elaborations and variations take, or would conceivably take, though no particular system known to me conforms fully to
this model. A sketch of such a model of interpretive methodology
would include: (1) a preamble which states that the purpose of the
methodology is to define and organize processes of resolving issues of
statutory interpretation in the best justified way; (2) definitions and
descriptions of the authorized types of interpretive arguments; (3)
general procedures for the rational construction of instances of such
types of arguments, with inventories of the materials that may be incorporated in such instances; (4) procedures for evaluation of the
force of instances of each type of argument, with some focus on the
main ways each type can break down; (5) specification of any "toprung" or other primacy that any general type of argument, e.g., the
argument from ordinary meaning, is to have, in competition with
other types; (6) any special considerations of relevance to general
types of statutes, e.g., criminal statutes may not be extended by analogy; and (7) appropriate methodological maxims for constructing
welljustified interpretations for use by judges when writing opinions,
and for use by other officials, and lawyers.
We may treat the foregoing, then, as merely general directions in
which a legal system might elaborate its own conception of the essential form of an interpretive methodology. Many systems have in fact so
elaborated their interpretive methods in some such directions to
some extent. As I have said, no single system known to me fully conforms to the foregoing model of the appropriate general form of an
interpretive methodology, and systems differ greatly in the degree to
which they resemble the model. Moreover, such elaborations and variations on minimal essential form are formal in several further ways
fully recognized in our language. All such elaborations and variations
are, of course, methodical, and we have seen that this is another established meaning of the word "formal."48 Additionally, some of these
elaborations and variations are also structural, and so formal in that
47 The United States does not have an accepted general interpretive methodology for
statutes. For an account of method and its variations in the U.S. Supreme Court, see id. at
407-59.
48
See supra note 41.
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way, as well. 49 Consider, for example, an elaboration which prioritizes
one general type of argument over another. Such an elaboration concerns the relations between different elements of the methodology
and thus is structural. Furthermore, some elaborations and variations
contribute to the definitiveness of the methodology, and so are formal
in this sense. 50 For example, those that define types of arguments and
specify procedures for their rational construction contribute to the
overall definitiveness of the methodology. In addition, the fact that
such a methodology is to a large extent prescribed in rules signifies
that it is preceptually formal, and therefore in this respect formal in
all the ways that rules are formal.
Nevertheless, even an interpretive methodology, which by nature
seems formal through and through, is not, in its operation, totally formal. Its general social acceptance as an authoritative methodology is
not formal. The "raw materials" that interpreters must deploy to instantiate types of argument are not formal. For example, the resources of ordinary language argumentation that figure in the
argument from ordinary meaning are not themselves formal. Nor are
committee reports, records of floor debates, and other evidence of
legislative history that figure in the argument from legislative history.
Nor is extrinsic evidence of legislative purpose that figures in the argument from ultimate purpose. Moreover, citizens, officials, judges and
other persons must apply a methodology if it is to be effective. Yet,
these requisite types of personnel, of course, are not formal. Nor is
the policy content of statutes being interpreted.
Basic functional elements of a modern legal system, then, are all
formal in a number of ways. Most fundamentally, all basic functional
elements of a legal system, even in their minimalist defining conceptions, are formal in the sense that each conforms to its own essential
form. A legislature without, for example, any voting procedure for
decisive resolution of conflicting views would not be a legislature. A
court that, for example, does not even require judicial impartiality
would not be a court. An interpretive methodology that imposes no
restrictions on what can count as an interpretation would be formless,
and so could not be a methodology. And so on, for each functional
element of a legal system. But beyond the minimal defining features
of the essential form of these constituent elements, there are, as we
have seen, also features, including elaborations and variations, that
are formal in still further ways. Here, we have encountered the procedural, structural, definitive, preceptual, and methodical formality of
legislatures, courts and of legal institutions generally. With regard to
49
50

See supra notes 18, 19.
See supra note 30.
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interpretive technique for statutes, we have encountered methodical,
structural, definitive and preceptual formality.
An analysis of the formal character of law's basic functional elements deepens understanding of those elements. It also heightens
awareness of the types of choices that must be made in their design
and administration. It likewise sharpens awareness of the distinction
between appropriate and inappropriate form. Thus, systematic
thought about the formality of a basic functional element can even
suggest fundamental ways in which the element may be improved.
Systematic thought about the formality of basic functional elements of
a given legal system can even uncover major gaps in those elements.
The American legal system, for example, lacks an accepted and coherent interpretive methodology for statutes. Nor has the American system ever squarely confronted the problem of justifying judicial
amendment of statutes. 51 Indeed, it may even be that American
judges depart from statutory rules in the guise of interpretation with
some regularity!
C.

The Formal Character of the System Viewed as a Whole

The first sense in which a legal system as a whole is formal is,
again, that it partakes of at least the minimum "essential form" of a
legal system. 5 2 In Western systems generally, this minimum includes
at least:
(1) basic functional elements such as a legislature, a court system,
etc., as constituents of the system;
(2) some integration and organization of these elements into general operational techniques, or the like;
51 As a result, the U.S. system has no methodology for this. Ordinarily, when our
judges depart from statutes, they do so in the guise of interpretation. Here are several
illustrative examples: Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (holding that a personal
moral code was a religion within the meaning of the statute despite statutory language

expressly to the contrary); Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 (1945) (permitting claim for
debt arising during World War II despite language barring claims after 1917). There are
many instances of departures in the highest courts of the states as well. See, e.g., Friends of
Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049 (Gal. 1972) (holding the California Environmental Quality Act applicable to private development despite clear language to the
contrary.) As two scholars have stressed: "[J]udicial departures from the obligation to decide in accordance with the established rules has become a deeply ingrained and characteristic feature of the judicial process, a feature sustained by the milieu in which Judges
operate." MORTIMER R. KADIsH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRTION TO DISOBEY 91 (1971). I
do not argue that no statutory departures are ever justified. I only argue that the U.S.
system should have a more formal methodology here in which judicial departures are
openly dealt with. The methodology would allow some types of departures but not others.
It would not be easy to devise such a methodology, but it would address whether and how
far departures would be permissible in such cases as the following: statutory obsolescence,
over-inclusion, under-inclusion, "core" inclusion yet in the face of powerful countervailing
principle or policy, and so on.
52

See supra note 15.
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(3) coherent bodies of law ordered in accord with criteria of validity; and
(4) principles of legality ("rule of law").
Not all systems share the foregoing in the same degree, and there is,
of course much elaboration and variation from system to system.
The second way in which a legal system considered as a whole is
formal is entirely derivative. A legal system is made up largely of various parts, and these parts include rules and other precepts, various
basic functional elements including legislatures, courts, and so on.
We have already seen how such rules, precepts, and basic functional
elements are themselves formal in a variety of senses. Indeed, several
varieties of form pervade such rules and elements.
A system of law is formal in still other ways, too. It is not possible
for any single basic functional element of a legal system to operate
entirely on its own to achieve the ends and values of a legal order.
Each such element must be combined with others. At the same time,
no basic functional element can be combined with other elements in
ad hoc, haphazard, and pattemless ways and yet be consistently effective. Each element must be systematically combined, integrated, organized, and coordinated within. general operational techniques for
creating and implementing law. These general techniques thus structure how law is made and implemented. Because ,of this structural
effect, and because these techniques are essentially methodical, they
53
are formal.
Thus a legal system viewed as a whole is far more than a mere
inventory of its basic functional elements. It also consists of general
operational techniques which combine, integrate and coordinate
these functional elements so to create and implement law. In modem
systems, it is possible to identify at least five main types of such general
54
operational techniques:
(1) the penal type of technique in which legislatures and courts
prohibit anti-social behavior, and these prohibitions along with police, prosecutors, and systems of punishment operate to punish
criminals and deter would-be criminals;
(2) the grievance-remedial type of technique in which legislatures
and courts define wrongful behavior, with courts providing remedies therefor, and the technique as a whole operating not only to
remedy grievances, but also to reduce their frequency and to induce
private settlement of grievance-remedial claims;
(3) the administrative-regulatory type of technique in which legislators, courts, and administrative officials lay down standards regulat53
54

(1971).

See supra notes 18, 19, 41.
See Robert S. Summers, The Technique Element in Law, 59 CAL. L. Rgv. 733, 736-45
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ing otherwise wholesome economic or other behavior,
administrators take steps, such as licensing, designed to secure compliance with those standards, and administrators impose sanctions
on violators (which may require court action too);
(4) the public-benefit conferral type of technique in which legislatures and public bureaucracies define substantive benefits such as
education, health care, welfare, public roadways, etc., define the
classes of eligible recipients, distribute these benefits, and secure
the material means required for such distribution (through taxation
and otherwise); and
(5) the private-ordering type of technique in which private parties
choose to enter into legally recognized types of consensual arrangements such as marriages, business and other contracts, employment
relations, corporate and other associations, property arrangements,
religious and social bodies, and more, with the law facilitating the
realization of the aims of such arrangements in various ways.
It is through these five types of relatively discrete structural patterns (and readily recognizable variants) that modem legal systems
combine, integrate, and coordinate basic functional elements of the
system to deter and punish anti-social behavior, deter and remedy
grievances, administratively regulate wholesome economic and other
activity, distribute public benefits, and facilitate private ordering. It
would, of course, be possible to provide, for any given system, a highly
detailed account of what roles each major functional element plays
within each of the foregoing formal techniques. These roles differ
somewhat from technique to technique. For example, the law-making
roles of a court vary depending on the technique in which the court is
functioning. Also, the relative roles of private citizens and public officials to take initiative to enforce the law or put the law in motion vary
from technique to technique. A legal system as a whole, then, is formal not only in its essential form, and is formal not only derivately in
the sense that it incorporates functional elements that are themselves
formal. A legal system is also formal in its general operational techniques which methodically combine, integrate, and coordinate these
elements, and which themselves operate as a whole in methodical
fashion.
There is still a further and related way in which modem legal
systems viewed as a whole are structurally and methodically formal.
Although these systems are far from uniform here, all of them provide, to some degree, for regulation of the law's operations in accord
with most or all of the principles of legality, i.e., the "rule of law."
These principles regulate how law itself is to be made and applied.
These principles generally require that, so far as feasible, the law take
the form of general rules; that these rules be clear and intelligible;
that any new law be publicly promulgated or otherwise publicly avail-
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able; that the citizenry generally have advance notice of the effective
date of new law and ready access thereto; that such new law generally
be prospective rather than retrospective in operation; that the law be
free of conflicts with other law; that all law be interpreted or applied
in accord with appropriate methodologies generally understood in advance; that prior to significant denials of claimed right, or to adverse
grants of remedy, or to imposition of sanctions, the party to be adversely affected have an opportunity to contest such action before an
independent and impartial body in accord with due process; and so
on. Such principles of legality regulate the operation of law's basic
functional elements and of law's general operational techniques, but
they are less concerned with efficacy than with the legitimacy and fairness of how law operates. Indeed, total failure of a system to implement merely a single such principle, e.g., prospectivity, may signify
that the system is not truly one of law at all.55 Such principles are
formal because they are structural and are methodical. 5 6 They govern
the operation of law's basic functional elements and general techniques, rather than directly determine the content of any law so made
and applied.
A legal system considered as a whole is also formal structurally in
the degrees to which it centralizes and hierarchically orders the making and implementation of law. It may, for example, centralize all lawmaking power in one legislature with country-wide jurisdiction or it
may decentralize this power. Also, it may, for example, centralize all
final judicial appeals from lower court cases in one country-wide
Supreme Court, or it may decentralize this role.
A modern legal system, viewed as a whole, is formal in still further
fundamental ways. The overall content of its bodies of law is relatively
unified and consistent, a fourth major sense in which such a system is
formal.5 7 Thus, in a legal system there are many possible sources of
prima facie valid law. Indeed, even within each type of general operational technique, there may be two or more institutions or entities
with authority to create prima facie valid law. For example, in a technique of the administrative-regulatory type, legislatures, courts, and
administrative agencies may all create prima facie valid regulatory law
applicable within the technique and to its addressees. In a technique
55
56

See FULLER, supra note 6, at 39.

See supra note 41.
OED entry no. 1.9 for "form" reads: "method of arranging the ideas in logical reasoning; good or just order (of ideas, etc.), logical sequence." 6 OED, supranote 13, at 79.
Also, the OED entry no. A.4.a for "formal" "Regular, having a definite principle, methodical." Id. at 82. Webster's entry no. 10.a for "form" reads "manner of co-ordinating elements
.. " WEBSTER'S, supra note 13, at 892. Webster's entry no. 1.b.1 for "formal" also includes
"having a symmetical arrangement of elements .... " Id. at 893. The foregoing notions at
least implicitly rule out inconsistency and incoherence.
57
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of the private ordering type, private parties, corporate and non-corporate, enter consensual arrangements of many kinds that, along with
legislative and judge-made law, are also prima facie valid. Indeed a
complete inventory of the authorized makers of law within a complex
modem system would extend well beyond those identified so far.
Given this multiplicity of authorized lawmakers in modem systems, the potential for conflicts between prima facie valid forms of law
emanating from different sources is considerable. The reality is that
such conflicts are common in some systems, and that in all systems
with which I am familiar, the prevailing criteria of validity provide, to
some extent, for the resolution of such conflicts in accord with a systematic hierarchical ranking of the law-making sources, e.g., legislative, judicial, etc. (Such criteria are mainly source-oriented rather
than content-oriented, and so are themselves largely formal.) It is familiar that in the United States, constitutional law takes priority over
statute law, and over all other conflicting types of law. Statutory law
takes priority over conflicting administrative regulations, over nonconstitutional judge-made law, and over all other law emanating from
sources lower in the hierarchy. 58 Judge-made law generally takes priority over contract law and other privately made law, including custom. Contract law takes priority over custom. Thus, a modem legal
system secures system-wide consistency in the content of its bodies of
law to a large extent through a hierarchical ranking of law-making
sources.5 9
But inconsistencies between laws arise not only from different
law-making bodies or sources of law. Inconsistencies also arise between laws made by the same law-making body or source. Thus inconsistencies may emerge as between two statutes or between two rules of
judge-made law. Mere hierarchical prioritization of different sources
is incapable of purging a system of inconsistencies such as these. Yet
the desiderata of systemic unity and consistency apply here, too, and
modem systems recognize various ways of securing these ends. For
example, statutory coherence is sought through interpretive techniques validating more specific statutes over more general ones, more
recent ones over earlier ones, and the like. Statutory coherence is also
achieved through model codifications and through ad hoc legislative
intervention. Similarly, a unified and coherent case law is secured
partly through a centralized judicial hierarchy that enforces adherence to higher court precedents and resolves conflicts in precedents
set by the lower courts of the same jurisdiction. Ad hoc legislative
intervention occurs here to secure consistency of precedent, too.
58 But American courts not infrequently depart from statutes in the name of interpretation when they are in fact amending statutes. See supra note 51.
59 See HART, supra note 6, at 100-110.
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The degree to which a legal system is complete in overall content
is still another dimension of formality.60 A system may be more, or
less, complete not only in basic policy content but also in basic organizational elements as well. (But then, too, there may be gaps.) Still
another formal systemic dimension is the degree of definitiveness of a
legal system as a whole. 61 A system is definitive to the extent that its
five general operational techniques, its devices for securing coherence
in the content of the system, and its provisions for orderly modes of
change are tightly organized and operate in regularized fashion.
This, in turn, is partly a function of what is yet another formal dimension, namely, the extent such matters are well-prescribed in rules with
citizens and officials ready to condemn departures and to take necessary remedial steps. In many Western systems, many such rules are
expressed in the special encapsulatory form of a written constitution.
In sum, a legal system is formal insofar as it conforms to the conception of the essential form of such a system accepted there, formal
derivatively in that its constituent functional elements are themselves
formal in a number of ways, formal structurally in its organization and
coordination of these elements into integrated general operational
techniques for making and implementing law, formal structurally and
methodically in its functioning in accord with such techniques, formal
structurally and methodically in its deployment of principles of legality and the rule of law, formal structurally in the degree it centralizes
the making and implementation of law, formal in the unity and consistency of its bodies of substantive and procedural law, formal in the
degree of completeness of its basic policy content and its basic organizational content, and formal in its overall definitiveness and in how
far its systemic features are preceptually prescribed and also embodied in a written constitution or other law.
II
WHY APPROPRIATE FoRM MATRS-SOME JURISPRUDENTIAL
IMPLICATIONS

The central problem of jurisprudence and the philosophy of law
is that of providing an account of the nature of law. One way to cast
light on the nature of law is to analyze law's basic characteristics and
the relationships between them. One such characteristic is that law is
formal. Among law's basic characteristics, form has special primacy.
60
OED entry no. A.3.b for the adjective "formal" states: "Made in proper form, regular, complete." 6 OED, supra note 13, at 82. Webster's entry for "formal" includes at 2.b:
'characterized by or formal in due order: regular." WEBSTER'S, supranote 13, at 893.
61 See supranote 30.
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Generally Appropriate Form as One Basic Characteristic of
Law

Law in a developed society consists of highly complex and varied
social phenomena which cannot be reduced to a simple set. The basic
characteristics of law are numerous, multi-faceted, and inter-related.
These basic characteristics may be succinctly categorized as follows:
(1) Characteristically, a system of law serves human interests, and if
62
it generally fails to do so, it is, as Plato suggested, not truly law.
(2) Where there is law in a modem society, it is characteristic that
the society recognizes and accepts as legitimate an authoritative, relatively autonomous, exclusive, and organized methodology for making and implementing legal rules and other legal devices of social
facilitation and control.
(3) This recognized and accepted methodology can itself be broken down into a characteristic set of basic functional elements including electoral processes, a legislature, courts, interpretive
methods, criteria of validity, bodies of law, and so on, some of which
consist of highly complex institutions and other social
arrangements.
(4) These basic functional elements are characteristically combined, ordered and integrated by and within various general operational techniques: penal, grievance-remedial, administrativeregulatory, public-benefit conferring, and private-arranging.
(5) Within these basic functional elements, and within these general operational techniques, the state, official personnel, private citizens and other legal entities characteristically fulfill law-making and
law-implementing roles in accord with a complex division and specialization of legal labor, itself defined and delimited by law.
(6) Characteristically, most of the law made by state organs is in the
form of general rules reduced to some written form, i.e., statute,
regulation, judicial opinion, etc., while law created by private parties
and entities may or may not be written, and takes more varied
forms, e.g., contracts, property arrangements, and wills.
(7) The totality of the bodies of state-made law characteristically
has a minimum substantive policy content encompassing at least basic protection of the bodily integrity of human beings, the protection of property and promises, and thus, characteristically serves
corresponding values.
(8) The law publicly and privately created is characteristically regarded as generating, in accord with criteria of validity and with
prescribed interpretive and other applicational methodologies, authoritative reasons for citizens and other entities, and for officials,
to take action or to make decisions accordingly.
(9) The addressees of the law characteristically act or decide voluntarily in accord with the authoritative reasons for action or decision
62

See PLATO, supra note 16, at 486-87.
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so generated by valid law and relevant interpretive or other applicational method, and the system is thus generally efficacious.
(10) The system, however, characteristically has the capacity to coerce or sanction those persons or entities who do not voluntarily act
in accord with the authoritative reasons so generated.
(11) The system characteristically provides for orderly modes of
change in the content and form of the law, in basic functional elements, and even in features of the system as a whole.
(12) The system characteristically operates, to a large degree, in
accord with certain general legal values, in accord with principles of
legality and the rule of law, and in accord with various limitations
on governmental power, and thus, characteristically serves the corresponding values.
(13) The operations of the system are characteristically dependent
for their efficacy on social acceptance and social attitudes, on a
common language, on the dissemination of various forms of legal
and other knowledge, on trained personnel, and on various other
social and material resources.
(14) The system is characteristically formal in rules and related devices, in basic functional elements, and in core features of the system taken as a whole.
The last general characteristic in the foregoing categorization is
that law is formal. In Part I of this Article, I have already introduced
the concepts required for the perspicuous and synoptic representation of this complex characteristic in its wide-ranging varieties. To
recapitulate briefly: rules of law are formal in that they conform to
the essential form of rules. Beyond this, all rules are formal structurally, expressionally, and encapsulatorily. Some rules are also formal in
that they have organizational content. A similar yet appropriately
modified analysis can be deployed to explicate the formality of rulings, principles, maxims, and other species of law. All basic functional
elements of a legal system such as the institutions of legislatures,
courts, and interpretive methodology for statutes are formal in their
conformity to the essential forms of such phenomena accepted in the
society, and are formal in their elaborations and variations beyond
minimal essential form: procedurally, structurally, methodically, definitively, preceptually, and encapsulatorily. The system as a whole is
formal insofar as it conforms to the minimal essential form of a legal
system, and is also derivatively formal insofar as its constituent functional elements are formal. The system as a whole is also structurally
and methodically formal in its general operational techniques which
incorporate, integrate, and coordinate these elements within functioning wholes. Further, the system as a whole is formal in its conformity to systemic rule-of-law principles which regulate how law is
made and applied in accord with each general operational technique.
The system as a whole is structurally and methodically also formal in
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its consistency and coherence of content, which is secured mainly
(though not only) through formal prioritization of potentially conflicting sources of law.
B.

Appropriate Form as a Characteristic Having Special Primacy

The formality of law is not merely one of the basic characteristics
of law, in itself and on its own. Generally, appropriate form has special primacy among all of law's characteristics, in five major respects.
Appropriate form underlies or figures in each of the other leading
characteristics of law. Moreover, appropriate form is required for the
very existence of the preceptual, institutional, and other elements of a
legal system. As Jhering emphasized, form is grounded in the innermost essence of law ("im innersten Wesen des Rechts begrfindet").63
In addition, appropriate form has primacy because it is indispensable
to legitimate, civic authority. Also, appropriate form has primacy because it goes to the very identity of a legal system. Further, appropriate form, especially in the institutionalized methodology of the
system, distinctively enshrines, symbolizes, radiates and reinforces
most of the fundamental values of the system.
First, the formal character of law has primacy among law's characteristics because it underlies or figures in each of the others. Rules
figure in all of these other basic characteristics, and rules are formal
in several major ways. Indeed, each of the other characteristics is itself
internally organized, and rules are the primary instruments of such
organization. One or more basic functional elements figures, directly
or indirectly, in each of the law's characteristics, and again, we have
seen that such elements are formal in several major respects. Further,
the formal features of the system as a whole, e.g., its structural, its
methodical, and its unifying features, are system-wide in scope and
bearing. Moreover, many varieties of form contribute directly and indirectly to the incorporation and organization of non-formal elements
within the law and the law's general operational techniques. These
non-formal elements include substantive policy content, official personnel, material resources, specialized knowledge, and more. Here,
form is a kind of binding that ties all together.
Secondly, the formal character of law has primacy among law's
characteristics because it is required for the very existence of the
preceptual, institutional, and other elements of any legal system. As I
have shown, rules can be formal in at least five major ways, and without rules in appropriate form, a modern system of law could not exist
because its essential institutions and processes could not be duly organized in the first place. Also, a system of law depends on basic func63

JHERING, GEIST,

supranote 6, at 479.
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tional elements such as a legislature, courts, criteria of validity, bodies
of rules, interpretive methodologies, and more. Plainly, such elements could not exist at all if they failed to conform at least to their
minimal essential forms, whatever those might be for the society involved. Also, such elements are dependent for their efficacy on elaborations of their formal features and subject matter, elaborations that,
if appropriate to their ends, typically must go beyond their minimal
essential forms. Even were such basic functional elements to exist and
be duly elaborated beyond their essential forms, we could still not
have a system of law in its full sense unless these elements were duly
combined, integrated, and coordinated within general operational
techniques for making and implementing law: the penal technique,
the grievance-remedial technique, the administrative-regulatory technique, the public-benefit-conferral technique, and the private-ordering technique. Such techniques are structural and methodical and so,
formal. Similarly, we could not have a system of law if these techniques failed to an appreciable degree to operate relatively systematically in accord with formal principles of legality and the rule of law. A
formless regime of political administration, or a formless reign of
"state" terror, could not operate in a sufficiently law-like way and so
could not count as a system of law, whatever the temporary efficacy of
any such "state" force and violence. Nor could we have a system of law
without general coherence of content, a further general formal
feature.
Thirdly, appropriate form has primacy among law's characteristics because it is indispensable to the very existence of duly constituted, and so legitimate, civic authority. Such authority is
foundational. The most fundamental political value is that of securing within a society legitimate political authority to make and implement law. Here, the antithesis is anarchy. Appropriate form is
indispensable to organized public decision-making-to the very existence of legitimate authority. Without duly constituted authority,
there can be no valid rules or other law, and no authoritative interpretive and other applicational method, and so, no legally authoritative
formal reasons for action. Without such reasons, there is no law. In
order for authority to make law to exist, the "authors" who make law
must be authorized. This authorization cannot exist if "law"-making is
ad hoc and haphazard. It must be organized and regularized through
the adoption and implementation of formal rules establishing lawmaking roles and conferring law-making power on occupants of those
roles. 6 4 Moreover, such authority must be similarly established for
64

An American judge once put matters this way:
Those who are impatient with the forms of law ought to reflect that it is
through form that all organization is reached. Matter without form is
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those who interpret and apply rules in cases of dispute. The very efficacy and legitimacy of the law's methodology for making and applying
rules and other law is heavily dependent on form. Appropriate form
is indispensable to organized public and private decision-making-to
the very existence of effective and legitimate authority. Without such
a "set" methodology and operational techniques, and without the established mandatory and exclusionary force of legally authoritative
reasons for action that this methodology and these techniques generate, there could be no social objects of sufficient determinateness and
constancy through time to which the people of a society could express
or imply their assent, acceptance, or acquiescence-the primary
sources of legitimacy in modem systems. And without such legitimacy, the levels of voluntary compliance in accord with the formal
reasons for action that law generates could not be sustained. Yet because the efficacy of the coercive apparatus of such systems is itself
also heavily dependent on such legitimacy, it might well be that this
apparatus could not then alone secure sufficient levels of compliance.
Fourth, any basic feature, or general set of features, that goes to
the very identity of the phenomena in question has a claim to primacy.
A primary measure of the very identity of any particular legal system is
the nature and extent of its formal character, overall. One way to test
this view is to imagine that a number of basic changes in the formality
of a given system take place over a discrete period, and then to pose
the issue of whether that system might be said to have lost its very
identity and to have taken on a new one. Suppose, for example, that
the formal constitutional structure of the system is changed in basic
ways, as from a cabinet form to a non-cabinet form, from a limited
electoral franchise to a fully democratic one, from a system without
judicial review of legislation to one with it, or from a system without
independence of the judiciary to one with it. And suppose also that
the system is changed from one of commonly incomplete rules at inception to largely complete ones; that the system is also changed from
one of open-ended rules to highly definite ones; that the system is
changed from one in which law is interpreted ad hoc and rather freely
in light of substantive ends and means implicated in particular cases
to one in which law is interpreted and applied more strictly in light of
an interpretive methodology of some formality; that the system is
changed from one in which judges have vast power to modify antecedent law at point of application to one in which they have only very
restricted power to do so. Now, if even only some of these changes
chaos; power without form is anarchy. The state, were it to disregard forms,
would not be a government, but a mob. Its action would not be administration, but violence.
Cochran v. State, 62 Ga. 731, 732 (1879).
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were cumulatively to occur, such a system, so changed solely in these
formal respects with their complementary manifestations in content,
would not any longer be considered the same legal system. And yet
many more such formal changes, major in nature, can be imagined.
Fifth, a system of law in appropriate form not only creates and
implements policy. The contours and content of its very institutional
and processual architecture, and its daily operations, can distinctively
express, enshrine, symbolize, radiate, and reinforce the legal commitments of the society to such fundamental political values as democracy, justice and fairness of process, rationality of decision-making,
principles of legality and the rule of law, liberty, limited government,
and still more. Appropriate form is indispensable here.
Consider the example of democracy. Appropriate form in the
law's institutional architecture and daily functioning is required to express, enshrine, symbolize, radiate, and thus reinforce this fundamental value. Without appropriate form, there can be no electoral
process and no elected legislature. Appropriate form here requires
not only the minimal essential forms for the existence of an electoral
process and of a legislature, but also various elaborations on these basic functional elements if they are to be effective. Many of these elaborations are organizational, structural, methodical, and procedural,
and so formal in all these ways. An electoral process is highly rule
defined, and it includes such rules as those that prevent ineligible persons from voting, and prevent persons from voting twice. Further, the
legislature has to be formally organized so that the results of democratic elections are, in turn, implemented in the law-making process.
Moreover, if the fundamental political value of democracy is to be
realized, organizational, structural, methodical, procedural, and other
formal limits must be imposed on still other institutions of the legal
system, and these must take appropriate encapsulatory form. For instance, courts and other authoritative institutions must not have a general power, in the guise of interpretation, to amend and thus undo
statutes adopted by the democratically elected legislature. This seems
obvious, but in some major Western democracies, judges amend statutes in just this way, a practice that has other adverse secondary effects
as well. For example, it imposes an impossible burden on what should
be the leading type of argument in any rationally designed methodology of statutory interpretation, namely, the argument from ordinary
meaning. This type of argument simply cannot survive the double
duty of justifying particular statutory interpretations when it is also
purportedly used to 'justify" departures from statutes as well.
The foregoing mode of analysis is only one way that the formal
character of law can cast light on the very nature of law itself, and this
mode of analysis is susceptible of further elaboration. Moreover, the
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formal character of law bears on still other major problems of jurisprudence and the philosophy of law besides the nature of law. It even
reveals in its own way important necessary connections between law
and morals. I will consider these and still other theoretical issues in
the book I am writing.
III
WHY APPROPRIATE FORM MA rus-SoM

FURTHER

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

We have already seen how the jurisprudential implications of appropriate form in the law are not merely jurisprudential. They are
themselves freighted with practical implications. What could be of
more practical relevance than the very existence of such basic functional elements of a legal system as a legislature and courts, and still
other types of institutional phenomena heavily dependent for their
efficacy on choices of appropriate form? Indeed, one may readily hypothesize the availability of all possible "raw materials" required for a
functioning legal order, including embryonic ideas of basic functional
elements, mere notions of relevant policy and of other values, potential official personnel, possible citizen willingness to accept duly constituted authority, available physical resources, general knowledge,
and more. Yet, all these "raw materials" would be useless without numerous choices of appropriate legal forms and their due implementation. Duly organized and duly formal institutions, processes,
methodologies, entities, and more, are required for the incorporation
of both formal and non-formal "raw materials" into an effective system
of law. Thus, as I have argued, appropriate form is indispensable to
the very creation of a system of law and to the very existence of legitimate civic authority. Also, if appropriate form in legal institutions,
processes and other basic functional elements incorporates, expresses,
enshrines, symbolizes, radiates, and reinforces fundamental values of
the society, then this must matter practically, too. Here, the distinction between theory and practice dissolves. Yet appropriate form is of
immediate practical significance in still other ways, too.
A.

Appropriateness of Form in the Law Has an Integrity of Its
Own, Cannot Be Taken for Granted and Must Be
Planned, Designed, and Secured

Although form pervades rules and other precepts, basic functional elements, and the system taken as a whole, it still does not follow that all these varied and wide ranging formal features and subject
matter will be appropriatelyformal in any particular system at any particular time. And if form is not appropriate, it may be ineffective as a
means to ends. It can even become an instrument of evil. And if form
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is not appropriate, if wrong choices are made as to form, and if these
wrong choices are consequential, it follows that form matters practically and that it requires due attention. The hazards of inappropriate
form are all the greater if unsound theories of form abound in a given
legal culture. Thus, if many theorists believe that any insistence on
formality must be formalistic, then it becomes all the more important
to demonstrate the contrary, and to give due attention to appropriateness of form. Alternatively, if some theorists believe that form really
has no integrity of its own, and, in application, always collapses into
something else, such as "substance," or "material content," or "policy,"
or the like, then again it becomes all the more urgent to demonstrate
the contrary, and to give due attention to appropriateness of form.
I do not believe it is possible usefully to characterize appropriate
form in the abstract. What constitutes appropriate form will vary with
the type of form involved. For example, appropriate structural form,
i.e., an appropriate degree of generality in a rule, is one thing, appropriate encapsulatory form for that same rule something else. What is
appropriate form will vary also with the type of legal phenomenon
involved. For example, an appropriately formal feature of a rule, such
as definiteness, may be one thing, while the appropriate overall definitiveness of an institution such as a court will be quite another. Similarly, the appropriate procedural form for a legislature will be quite
different from the appropriate procedural form for a court.
Appropriateness of form depends not only on the type of form,
and the type of legal phenomenon involved. It also depends on the
type of subject matter involved. In the case of rules, for example,
some types of subject matter require, or perhaps even dictate, highly
formal rules whereas other subject matter dictates rules that are less
formal. The very subject matter of a statute of limitations may be said
to dictate high degrees of definiteness and completeness, for example. Otherwise, it could not serve its primary function of repose. The
very subject matter of a rule providing for the award of custody of
children, however, may be said to require or dictate a less definite and
less complete rule. Of course, appropriateness of form also depends
on the problem-specific policy or policies to be served, and any general legal values implicated, a subject I will treat at length in Part IH.D
of this Article.
It may be that at some future time it will be possible, on the basis
of accumulated experience and reflection, to articulate what might be
called "laws of appropriate form." For example, it may be possible to
formulate a kind of "law" to the effect that whenever the rights of
third parties may be adversely affected, as with the issuance of certain
commercial instruments, appropriate form generally requires highly
definite and complete rules. Such "laws" could serve as maxims for
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drafters, and could have still other uses. But whatever the prospects
here for the formulation of such "laws" of appropriate form, the very
exercise of trying to formulate such laws and of then evaluating them
is certainly one way to deepen our grasp of this complex subject. Let
us consider another simple example, a more general one. We might
imagine the following candidate for status as a "law" of appropriate
form: "The more formal, or the more highly formal, the more appropriate." On reflection, however, we should reject any such "law." It is
familiar that, for example, some precepts require relatively low degrees or low levels of formal attributes. Awarding custody on the basis
of the best interests of the child is an example. A high degree of definiteness and completeness in a rule on custody could, for example,
require that the child always be awarded only to one parent, such as
the mother, or to the parent with the most material resources. But
such a more formal rule could be justly criticized for neglecting other
considerations more relevant to the well being of the child, overall. In
an important sense the rule would be over-formal, i.e., formalistic
(though this is not the only sense of "formalistic"). It is simply a fallacy to conclude that in matters of legal ordering the more formal or
the higher formality is always the more appropriate. Likewise, it is a
fallacy to conclude that low formality or lesser degrees of formality are
always inappropriate.
It follows that form can be appropriate, and yet not be formalistic. Appropriate form, then, is hardly a contradiction in terms. This is
not to say that what is truly formalistic can still be appropriate. When
form is appropriate, it is not formalistic-is not overformal and thus
bad form. But the pathology of form-the systematic study of the major varieties of inappropriate form-would also require that we go beyond the over-formal, i.e., the formalistic. The study of the pathology
of legal form requires that we also consider the underformal, and thus
the substantivistic (though in the legal academic world in America,
some scholars are not especially sensitive to this type of defect). Just
as there can be many meanings of formalistic, so there can be various
meanings of substantivistic. One of these is simply that the rule is too
open-ended, providing little or no firm guidance to its addressees on
the front lines of human interaction, and in instances of disputed applicability, inviting an endless canvassing of all possible substantive
considerations. An example is a highway "speed limit" (as in Montana) requiring only that drivers drive "reasonably."65
The pathology of legal form also includes the study of how rules
that are initially well-designed and so appropriately formal become
substantivistic in judicial application. 66 In such instances, it might be
65
66

MONT.CODE ANN.§61-8-303 (1995).
I am indebted to Professor DeMott for leading me to think further about this.
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said that appropriate form in the rule is swallowed up by (or collapses
into) substantive considerations of policy or of justice and equity in
the particular case. 6 7 It cannot be denied that, in the American system, appropriate form in a rule sometimes, perhaps frequently, vanishes in judicial application, especially when the rule seems to over- or
under-include. Versions of the parol evidence rule in the American
law of contracts provide familiar examples. So many meanings have
been given to its terms, and so many exceptions created to it, that in
some jurisdictions it has become something of a sieve. 68 But the problem is hardly confined to judge-made law. Even appropriate form in a
well-designed statute may be swallowed up in a frenzy ofjudicial policy
making at point of application.
But there is nothing inevitable about the undue collapse of appropriate form into substance, into policy, or into justice and equity in
the course of applying a rule to a particular case. While any legal
system might reasonably confer on judges some limited power of dispensation or even power of statutory amendment (duly circumscribed), thereby explicitly enabling judges to disregard appropriate
form in certain cases, it would hardly follow that appropriate form in
rules would then no longer have any role to play. Appropriate
prescriptiveness, generality, definiteness, and completeness in rules,
for example, would continue to be general desiderata if for no other
reason than that there is much more to rules than substantive policy.
Moreover, there is nothing inherent in these formal features that
lends them to being so swallowed up. They have an integrity of their
own. Indeed, any legal system that regularly tolerates wholesale judicial departures from appropriate form in antecedent rules simply cannot be said to have a genuine rule of law.
The study of the pathology of legal form also requires that we
study what might be called the "malformed." An institutionalexample
of malformation is an adjudicative process in which the role of zealous
complainant-oriented prosecutor is purportedly combined with the
important role of an impartial and neutral tribunal finding facts and
applying law. Any attempt to combine these inconsistent roles to a
significant degree risks the forfeiture of both the reality and the appearance of the impartiality and neutrality of the tribunal. A body
that seeks first to approach the evidence in a partisan prosecutorial
67
This way of thinking has some respectable antecedents. See, for example, the work
of John Stuart Mill: "All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems
natural to suppose, must take their whole character and color from the end to which they
are subservient." JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GovERNMENT 2 (A.D. Lindsay ed., 1951).
68
See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d
641 (Cal. 1968). For a different view of the rule see Trident Center v. Connecticut GeneralLife
Insurance,847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988).
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spirit is likely in the course of that to prejudge or appear to prejudge
when it later comes time to find the facts. Moreover, such a process is
likely to be, and to appear, unfair to the adversely affected party. Any
such process would be malformed.
But I cite this example not merely to illustrate malformation of
an institution. I also wish to contrast this example with its appropriately formal counterpart, an adjudicative process having appropriate
role differentiation. Such a process also illustrates how appropriate
form in adjudication has an internal integrity of its own which does
not collapse into something else such as "substance," or "material content," or "policy," or justice and equity of outcome in the particular
case (or whatever the adjudicator takes to be the ultimate end or ends
of the process). Indeed, we judge the appropriateness of the design
of a basic functional element such as an adjudicative process not only
in light of the policy, equity, or other "outcome" ends it may serve
through accurate fact-finding and objective application of law. We
also judge its appropriateness in terms of whether it is intrinsically fair
as a process. 69 And we try to design it to differentiate prosecutorial and
fact-finding roles, with an eye to the intrinsic fairness of the process as
such. Indeed, let us suppose that the policy ends of substantive rules
being adjudicated would be served as well or almost as well without
such role differentiation. We ought nonetheless to embrace role differentiation on grounds of intrinsic processual fairness. It follows that
appropriate adjudicative form, even insofar as designed to serve policy
ends, does not in any sense collapse into those extrinsic ends. Its design is informed by internal considerations of processual fairness, too.
And, as appropriate form, it has an existence and a stability all its own.
It is not to be "appropriated" to something else.
B. Appropriate Authorizational Form Is Commonly Required
Not Only to Validate But Also to Determine the Very
Content of Law
The authority to make valid law is always conditioned to a large
extent on following appropriate form-on what I will call requirements of "authorizational form." For example, the authority of a legislature to make a valid statute depends on the extent of its law-making
power, on the procedures it follows (including voting procedures),
and on mode of promulgation. Validity here depends largely on compliance with appropriate authorizational form, and so is largely for69
See Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Pleafor "Process
Values,"60 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1974); see also Robert S. Summers, ProfessorFuller'sJurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HAuv. L. REv. 432, 444-45 (1978).
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mal. 70 The only major exception in some Western systems is where
validity depends also on compliance with any applicable content-oriented criterion of validity.
A legislature regularly enacts valid statutes. Administrative officials and bodies regularly make valid orders and valid regulations.
Courts create precedents that are valid. Private parties make valid
contracts and valid wills, and create corporations and the like. But
validative effect is not the only effect of actions that conform to appropriate authorizational form. That is, legislative and other law-making
is not merely validative. Such action is also commonly determinativeof
law's content as well, a major factor that further demonstrates the
practical significance of form in the law. When legislatures enact statutes, this very action commonly resolves issues of content as well as
validates that content. This occurs because, as St. Thomas Aquinas
long ago emphasized, the powers of human reason and persuasion are
limited, and so must often be supplemented by the exercise of formal
authority in determining the very content of law.7 1 It is only through
appropriate form that many necessary law-making choices can be
made at all. Appropriate authorizational form is, in such instances
determinative, as well as validative, of content.
It is true that the power of human reason, and of persuasion,
largely or exclusively determines the content of some statutes. For
example, a proposed statute may simply incorporate a ready-made, rationally justified, and intrinsically persuasive moral principle such as
72
the principle that contracting parties shall perform in good faith.
Here, let us assume that the entire content of the law is determined
more or less by the force of human reason and persuasion. In its statutory embodiment, the principle may even remain almost identical in
content to its usual formulation in the general critical morality of the
society. Here we may say that conformity with appropriate authorizational form, in itself, contributes little or nothing to the determination of the content that is ultimately validated. Conformity merely
validates. That is, it merely renders the content legal. There are still
other types of cases where the exercise of formal authority merely contributes the stamp of validity, the stamp of appropriate authorizational
form, while the weight of human reason (including persuasiveness)
70
OED entry no. A.5 for "formal" states: "Done or made with the forms recognized as
ensuring validity .... " 6 OED, supra note 13, at 82. Webster's entry no. 2.b for "formal"
provides: "done in due form." WEBSTER'S, supra note 13, at 893.
71 See, e.g., ST. THOMAS ACQUINAS, TREATisE ON LAW 78 (Gateway ed., 1965). See also
JoHN FiHNis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 284-90 (1980).

72 See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."); Robert S. Summers, "Good
Faith" in General ContractLaw and the Sales Provisionsof the Unifonn Commercial Code, 54 VA. L.
REv. 195 (1968).

1214

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1165

determines all else. For example, the weight of policy reasoning is
sometimes heavily and discernibly on one side, and general legal values such as predictability and equality before the law may unequivocally point the same way, as with, for example, a rule that generally
permits citizens of a society to own property. Here, too, reason (including persuasiveness) may be said to be almost entirely determinative of the proposed content of the law, with formal authority merely
validating that content.
But there are many other types of examples along a continuum
on which the influence of reason (including persuasion) diminishes,
and the role of formal authority-of mere authoritative choice-increases in determining the content of law to be validated. Consider a
general highway speed limit of, say 65 mph. Here, the weight of policy reasoning heavily favors having some speed limit. Also, the weight
of reason by way of general legal values such as predictability, the
"learnability" of law, the dignity and efficiency of citizen self-direction,
equality before the law, freedom from arbitrary official interference,
factual realizability, and dispute avoidance all weigh heavily in favor of
a definite speed limit in a precise rule. But even with this powerful
convergence of policy reasoning and general legal values, the power
of reason alone in this type of example, is still not itself wholly determinative. Why 65 mph? Why not 64? 66? 67? Here, some exercise of
formal authority alone is required to determine the specific number.
Thus, we may say that, here, choice in the name of the appropriate
authorizational form for enactment of a statute not merely validates
content, but also plays at least a limited role in the final choice of the
very content to be validated.
And, as we move farther out along our continuum, we encounter
more examples in which mere authoritative choice in the name of
appropriate authorizational form, not merely validates content but increasingly contributes, in itself, to the resolution of issues of content,
and thus, is determinative of content as well. Consider, for example, a
proposed statute of limitations for breach of warranty. Should it be
for two years? Four years? Here, the force of reason strongly favors
the policy goal or end of such a statute, but does not so clearly favor
one means over another-two years over four. It might be said here
that, as to means, the reasons favoring the alternatives are stalemated.
This is not uncommon. And stalemate may occur farther along the
means-end continuum, more in respect to ends than means. Consider, for example, a proposed statute always awarding custody of a
child of divorced parents to the mother. Here, the reasoning favoring
such a proposal may be the argument that the maternal relationship is
special. But the policy and the equitable considerations generally
weighing the other way could, in a given society be equally or almost
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equally strong in many particular cases. When ends are thus stalemated, yet there is still need for settled law, appropriate authorizational form determines, or goes far to determine, that content.
Indeed, in cases far along the continuum, it may, in a sense, even be
all there is.
So far, I have stressed the determinative effect on content of
mere law-making choice in the name of appropriate authorizational
form. The formal criteria of authorized source, of scope, of voting
and other procedures, of due enactment, of appropriate promulgation, and the like, not merely ultimately enablevalid law to be adopted.
They also exert pressurefor determinate resolution of issues with respect
to the content of proposed law. These, however, are not the only ways
that formality in the law exerts pressure for resolution of issues of content in the law-making processes. Anytime the law to be adopted is
also to be embodied in a rule or other precept with formal features
that may on their own serve policy and other values in varying degrees, those formal features and the values they implicate will exert
their own pressure for the structuring of content. I now turn to this.
C. Appropriate Form in a Precept Is Required for It to Serve as
an Adequate Means to Policy Goals
If law is to serve adequately as a means to policy goals, law must
not only have relevant policy content. It must also have appropriate
preceptual and other form. AsJhering said: "There can be no content
without form."73 At the law-making stage, various types of choices of
preceptual (and other) form are necessary. And each choice might
be made appropriately or inappropriately. Consider the example of a
legislative proposal to require automobile owners to have periodic inspections for roadworthiness. The proposer of such a law would have
to choose an appropriate preceptual form for imposing this duty of
inspection, and related duties. Notjust any preceptual form would be
appropriate. The preceptual form of an order would be too particular. A general principle would be too imprecise. A broad grant of
discretion to owners would not be apt, although some cars might not
require annual inspection. Clear guidance to citizens out of court is
required. Only the preceptual form of a relatively definite rule would
be appropriate (and several rules would be required at that). We have
seen that the essential form of a rule consists largely of a general prescription that is also complete and definite in some degree.
It is plain that the mere choice of an appropriate preceptual
form, i.e., a rule, can not itself guarantee appropriateness of form in
all its other varieties. It is even possible to choose an appropriate
73

JHERING, GElST,

supra note 6, at 473 (translation my own).

1216

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1165

preceptual form, such as a rule, yet fail to choose an appropriate degree of generality, definiteness, completeness, or some other structurally formal feature such as simplicity. If, for example, the duty to have
vehicle inspections is not made sufficiently definite, the policy of
safety will not be well served. Thus, appropriate form requires not
only the choice of a suitable type of precept but also choice of formal
features which appropriately structure the policy content of the rule.
And in our present example, a number of rules with appropriate formal features would be needed, for the law creator would have to address a number of questions if the policy is to be sufficiently refined to
be operational, including: What vehicles should be subject to inspections? How frequently? By whom? What should be the scope of an
inspection? With what effects? And so on.
Our law creator would also be called upon to consider, if only
briefly, still a further type of choice of form, namely, "encapsulatory
form." The decision having already been made that such a regulatory
matter cannot be left to enlightened evolution of private customary
practice, the lawmaker would also be certain to rule out case-by-case
common law development. (Of course, the matter does not qualify
for constitutional embodiment.) Only the encapsulatory form of statute or regulation would be appropriate here.
Choices of appropriate expressional form would also be on the
lawmaker's agenda, though these overlap somewhat with issues of
structural form. Thus, how explicit should the law be? Should it be
expressed in lay language or in technical vocabulary?7 4 And so on.
In sum, choices of appropriate preceptual, structural, encapsulatory, and expressional form are required if law is to implement policy satisfactorily. Choice of policy content is never alone enough. Of
course, there will be interactions here between formal features and
policy content, in the course of arriving at the final form and content
of the rule.
D.

Appropriate Form in Precepts Is Also Required as a Means to
General Legal Values, and Such Form Sometimes
Justifies Limited Sacrifice of Policy

Whenever law is used to serve policy goals, this also implicates
some general legal values, including predictability, "learnability" of
law, fair notice, the dignity and efficiency of citizen self-direction
under law, equality before the law, freedom from official arbitrariness,
and dispute avoidance. The category of general legal values is large
and complex, but for present purposes it is not necessary to catalog
74
See HARRY W.JoNES, THE EFFICACY OF LAW 18-19 (1968) (recounting how the choice
of lay terms can be optimal).
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these values. Roughly, general legal values differ from policies in two
major ways. Policies are problem-specific in scope, whereas general
legal values are not. That is, some (perhaps many) general legal values come into play whenever law is used to implement Any policy,
whatever its problem-specific content. Second, only uses of law bring
most general legal values into play. Many policies pursued through
law, however, may be or are concurrently pursued through non-legal
means as well.
Rules should be designed and administered so far as feasible not
only to serve policy goals but also to serve general legal values. But
will choice of the same form in a rule or other law that is appropriate
as means to policy also be appropriate as means to the realization of
general legal values?
Consider this example, again from a familiar context. We may
imagine two candidates for a highway speed limit rule: Rule A imposes
a speed limit of 65 mph (possibly subject to limited modification
through enforcement practice) and Rule B specifies no precise limit
and requires only that drivers drive at reasonable speeds. Both rules
have policy content and formal features. We might also say that Rule
A and Rule B have the same degree of the formal feature of generality.
Yet Rule A is simpler, more definite, and more complete at inception,
and thus differs from Rule B in these formal features, and so in corresponding content. If we focus merely on appropriate preceptual and
structural formality, the question arises: which rule has the form (with
corresponding content) that is more appropriate as the means to the
policies of highway safety and efficient traffic flow?
In my view, the form of Rule A is the more appropriate means to
these policies. Its formal features of simplicity, definiteness, and completeness generate more determinate guidance and thus, clearer formal reasons for action by drivers. The conceptual content of the rule
is specific and immediately intelligible. The facts on which the rule
turns are easily and readily determinable. Hence, the rule is factually
realizable. Also, the rule and the formal reasons it generates exclude
other substantive considerations that could operate at point of application. Drivers can better self-administer this simpler, more definite,
and more complete rule than they can the "drive reasonably" rule.
They can also coordinate their driving with the driving of others more
effectively. Assuming that a 65 mph speed limit is itself empirically
justified, the form of Rule A will therefore serve the policies of safety
and efficient traffic flow more effectively than the form of Rule B.
This is true even though Rule A over-includes (some roads may be safe
above 65) and under-includes (some roads may be unsafe even at less
than 65), whereas Rule B, on its face, neither over-includes nor underincludes. Under Rule B, however, drivers will be called upon to make
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far more judgments on their own as to what speeds are safe, and will
probably err more often as to what is reasonable (e.g., judge a road
safe at a given speed when it is not), a major factor that may well offset
75
any policy losses from the over- and under-inclusion of Rule B.
In this example, the choice of form that is more appropriate as
the means to policy-here, the simpler, more definite, and more complete 65 mph rule-is, at the same time, also the more appropriate
form to serve nearly all general legal values. Thus, the two types of
effects of form as means are here concordant. The form of the simpler, more definite and more complete 65 mph rule-Rule A-serves
general legal values more fully than the form of the "drive reasonably"
rule-Rule B, and so is the more appropriate form overall. Consider
several such general legal values. Rule A provides more certainty,
more predictability, and fairer notice to drivers than Rule B because
Rule A affords drivers better access to the operative content of the law
when driving (including any modifications arising from enforcement
practice). Rule A also accords drivers the dignity and efficiency of
self-direction without official intervention far more than Rule B (at
least in American conditions). Indeed, Rule B may induce police, out
of role-borne zeal (or other motives), regularly to second-guess drivers, thereby substituting their own ad hoc substantive judgment for
that of drivers. Such official interventions under Rule B would diminish scope for responsible and effective choices and so diminish the
dignity and efficiency of citizen self-direction under law. At the same
time, Rule A promises more equality before the law and still more
freedom from official arbitrariness, for it vastly reduces the opportunities for officials to treat similar cases differently, as compared to the
open-ended Rule B. Further, and as already indicated, Rule A will
generate far less dispute than Rule B, for Rule B is conceptually less
determinate, and a more fecund source of factual dispute.
As the foregoing example indicates, the same formal features that
serve policy well may also serve general legal values well. We might
call this phenomenon in legal ordering the "CONCORDANT EFFECTS OF APPROPRIATE FORMS." Here appropriate formality,
problem-specific policy, and general legal values are in unison. This
highly fortunate convergence, though perhaps only an accident of
fate, is, I believe, quite common in legal ordering.
But such "concordant effects" of a choice of appropriate form are
far from universal. Sometimes the formal features of law that are appropriate for the realization of certain general legal values serve those
values only at the expense of at least some sacrifice of policy efficacy.
When that is so, we may encounter what might be called the "DIS75

See SCHAUER, supra note 6, at 149-55 (1991).
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CORDANT EFFECTS OF APPROPRIATE FORMS." The form more
appropriate as the means to fuller policy realization should not necessarily take primacy. Rather, the choice of form more appropriate as
means to general legal values may, in light of those valuesjustify some
level of sacrifice of policy realization. When that is so, we may call this
the "GLV PRIORITAL EFFECT" (an effect of General Legal Values
that enthusiasts of "law is policy" tend to overlook).
I will now provide one example of the discordant effects of form
that also illustrates how the "GLV PRIORITAL EFFECT" may justify
some level of sacrifice of policy realization. Consider another prosaic
yet highly important problem of legal policy, namely, when and how
to retire and replace aging police officers on the beat. Let us assume
that a rule requiring police supervisors to make an ad hoc annual inquiry into the fitness of an officer in each case after an appointed age,
say age 55, would in fact be the most effective means of identifying fit
and unfit officers, and thereby of serving the policy of having a fit
force. Through full-fledged inquiries into fitness, itself a multi-faceted
concept, the unfit would be sorted out, case by case, and retired.
Such a rule, however, would not be very definite, and it might turn
out to be not at all simple. A rule with these formal features would
not serve general legal values well compared to an alternative rule requiring all officers in active police work to retire, say, at age 60. This is
so in several ways, but I will suggest only four. First, compared to a
"fitness" rule, an "age 60" rule would be more certain and predictable
in operation and would thus afford officers and their families a more
reliable basis on which to plan retirement. It would also afford police
supervisors a more reliable basis on which to plan replacements.
Second, the enforced retirement of officers in accord with the
"age 60" rule would maximize the freedom of officers and their families from administrative irregularity. The rule would leave little or no
scope for official arbitrariness or inconsistency of treatment, and thus
would also serve equality before the law. The open-endedness of the
fitness rule, on the other hand, would afford administrators opportunities to adjust or even manipulate the concept of fitness or any relevant findings of fact, with consequent decreases in objective and fair
administration, and in the appearance thereof.
Third, the officers and others affected under an "age 60" rule
would be able to see readily that particular retirement decisions are
made solely on the basis of clear antecedent law applicable to their
cases, and thus would perceive these decisions to be fully authorized
and legitimate. This would be significantly less certain under a fitness
rule, which would be far more disputatious, and would provoke calls
for a costly appeals procedure inside the administration.
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Fourth, the "age 60" rule would be much cheaper to administer.
It would not require case by case inquiries into fitness on an individual basis.
The far greater furtherance of general legal values under the
"age 60" retirement rule, would, in my opinion, justify a choice of this
rule as the more appropriately formal rule over the alternative "fitness" rule, at least assuming there is a close enough general correlation in the first place between age 60 and unfitness. 7 6 I believe this
choice would be justifiable even though the "age 60" rule plainly overincludes and under-includes, that is, even though it would retire some
officers still in their prime at 60 and fail to retire some no longer in
their prime prior to 60. As I have earlier suggested, even under an ad
hoc fitness rule, mistake or bias would be likely to enter into some
decisions, and this, along with the greater realization of general legal
values under an age 60 rule, would counterbalance the over- and
under-inclusion of such a rule. In the end, perhaps we could say that
the "age 60" rule does not over-include or under-include at all. This is
because it incorporates, as part of its content, the limited priority of
general legal values over the fitness policy as such.
Here, then, the choice of form appropriate as a means to general
legal values would justifiably triumph to an extent over what would
otherwise be the substantive policy content of a rule. As I have said,
we might call this the "GLV PRIORITAL EFFECT" on appropriate
form in the content of a rule. Here, the formal demands of general
legal values diverge from the formal demands of problem-specific policy, and the former take priority to an extent in the adoption of a rule.
This is only one of the major ways that a choice of appropriate form
affects content in legal ordering, but it takes place in rule-making, and
is one of the most dramatic of all types of effects of form on substantive content. Observe that in this and in many similar examples, this
dramatic effect occurs not only by way of incorporating the more appropriately formal "age 60" feature of form and content, but also necessarily by way of excluding other substantive content, i.e., excluding a
direct and full-fledged inquiry into substantive fitness, case-by-case.
This type of exclusionary effect is, of course, a typical normative effect
of form in the law. Thus, we must heed not only what form incorporates, but also what it excludes. This effect might be called the "SUBSTANTIVE EXCLUSIONARY EFFECT OF APPROPRIATE FORM."
We may conclude that some problem-specific policies require
lower degrees of definiteness for their most effective implementation.
76
The question of when a sufficiently close general connection exists, in light of policies and values at stake, is a complex question which I will address in detail in my forthcoming book. Legislative drafting manuals almost universally ignore this and other questions of

appropriate form as such.

1997]

HOW LAW IS FORMAL

1221

But most such policies are ones that already depend for their effectiveness not mainly on citizen self-application of rule out on the front
lines of human interaction (as in the periodic vehicle inspection example, and in the speed limit example), but rather on official orjudicial administration of rule in the usual case. This is true, for example,
of various substantive standards for the official issuance by health authorities of licenses to public restaurants, to the "best interest of the
child" standard in custody disputes before welfare agencies and
courts, and to various sentencing guidelines in criminal cases before
judges. In all three of these examples, there is not a "front line of
human interaction" where citizens must have "pre-administrative" or
"prejudicial" guidance in the fashion required by citizens in my vehicle inspection example and my speed limit example. All three of
these examples require official or judicial application of the law to
specially found facts, and depend on this for policy effectiveness,
rather than on citizen self-application in the usual case. But even
where the policies are thus officially or judicially administered in the
usual case, sometimes the highly definite rule will still be preferable,
as in my police retirement example.
In concluding this Section, I will add that a choice of form and
the general legal values it independently serves may have an even
more fundamental kind of legal significance, too. If general legal values are not sufficiently served in an actual or projected use of law, this
may be a sign that the use of law may not really be law-like, may lack
legitimacy, and so may at least be presumptively unwarranted in its
entirety. This is all the more true if fundamental political values such
as legitimacy and freedom are adversely implicated as well.
E. Appropriate Form as a Desideratum in the Creation of a Rule
or Other Precept Tends to Beget Good Content Therein
When responsible legislators and other lawmakers create rules
and other legal precepts, they also strive for good content. Insofar as
they also strive for appropriate form, this tends to beget good content.
"Good content" in a rule includes content that serves well as a means
to policy goals. Suitability as a means to policy is not merely a matter
of relying on relevant causal generalizations such as that annual vehicle inspections reduce accidents. We saw in Sections C and D above
how formal features of a proposed rule such as degree of definiteness
may also be more suitable than others as means to the relevant policy.
Indeed, such features manifest themselves in content. When a
lawmaker formulates the formal features of a rule so that the rule is
more suitable as means to policy, this is one way that attention to appropriate form may tend to beget good content in the precept as a
whole.
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But "good content" in a rule also includes its suitability as a
means to the realization of general legal values, too. We saw in Section D above how some formal features of a proposed rule may be
more suitable than others as a means to general legal values. "Good
content" in a rule may refer to this. When a lawmaker formulates the
formal features of a rule so that the rule is more suitable as a means to
general legal values, this is still another way that attention to appropriate form tends to beget good content in the precept overall. When
the form required for efficacious policy and the form required for
efficacious realization of general legal values are discordant, as illustrated in the police retirement example, and the lawmaker goes on to
make the more justified choice, this is a further way that due attention
to appropriate form tends to beget good content overall in the precept finally created.
Yet the proposition that due attention to appropriate form in the
creation of precepts tends to beget good content overall can be developed still further. Those who create legal rules must choose appropriate degrees of formal features, including appropriate degrees of
generality, definiteness, and completeness. Assume the drafter of a
statutory rule is one who rigorously considers the appropriate degree
of generality in the rule under consideration. Such a drafter Will be
more likely to identify and incorporate into the rule those general
categories of things, persons, actions, circumstances, etc., to which the
rule should apply if it is to serve effectively as a means to the problemspecific policy at hand. For example, given the ends of safety and
traffic flow, a rule with content specifying a speed limit should be
highly general in scope, and thus should apply to all drivers of all
types of vehicles. Here, at least some of the resulting "fit" of means to
ends should be attributed to the thoughtful consideration given to the
appropriate degree of the formal feature of generality. Of course, in
this example so far, I assume that the appropriate degree of the formal feature of generality is driven primarily, if not entirely, by the
problem-specific policy at stake.
But generality may be rationally driven by general legal values,
too. One such value is that of treating like cases alike, and another is
the related value of minimizing arbitrariness in lawmaking. A proposed law that would confer benefits on persons may unjustifiably fail
to extend those benefits to all who are similarly situated. For example, a local ordinance providing generally for the grant of licenses to
supermarkets might include an exception denying such licenses to
WalMart. This would not only fail to implement the relevant policy,
but unfairly discriminate as well, and thus fail to secure equality
before the law, a general legal value. The law would also be unjustifiably under-inclusive in its conferral of benefits and so not appropri-
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ately general. The desideratum of appropriate generality may be said
to exert special force of its own that distinctively favors more inclusive
content, a force attributable to the general legal value at stake. When
this wins out, we may say that good form-appropriate generality-is
one of the factors begetting good content. And here, the appropriate
form of generality is not merely a means to something else, i.e., some
policy or policies. We treat similarly situated persons the same before
the law also because that is worth doing in itself. (We do not universalize merely in order to do justice. We universalize, and in that, do
justice.)
Similarly, the generality of a proposed law that would impose burdens is rationally driven not only by the policy behind the burden, but
also by the general legal values of treating like cases alike and the
related value of minimizing arbitrariness in lawmaking. Yet a proposed law might, solely because of the excessive political influence of
its proponents, fail to impose a burden on all those who are similarly
situated. Indeed, it might even create an exception for a favored class.
Such a law would be unjustifiably under-inclusive and so not appropriately general. Here, too, the desideratum of generality would exert
justificatory force of its own favoring the more inclusive content, force
attributable to the general legal values at stake. And when this desideratum wins out, we may again say that good form-appropriate generality-is one of the factors begetting good content in the final
version of the rule that is adopted.
Definiteness and completeness are still other formal features of
rules that serve not only problem-specific policies but general legal
values as well. Thus, among other things, these features provide fair
notice and contribute to the determinateness and so, citizen self-administrability of rules. These features exert force that (along with
generality) resolves and refines the content of a proposed rule in the
course of its rational construction. Without appropriate definiteness
and completeness, a rule could not be satisfactorily operational. In
resolving and refining the content of a rule, definiteness and completeness (along with generality) express, prescribe, structure, constrain, and delimit content. And the tendency is to beget good
content, or at least better content than would otherwise result. Per
contra, bad form tends to beget bad content, as Roscoe Pound noted
when he said "irrationality of form continually breeds irrationality of
77
substance."

77

3 PouND, supra note 22, at 735-36.
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F. Appropriate Form in Basic Functional Elements of the System
Tends to Beget Good Content, and Good Processes
We have seen how basic functional elements of a legal system
such as a legislature, courts, and interpretive methodologies exhibit
minimal essential form, and we have seen how these elements are also
structurally formal, procedurally formal, formal in degree of definitiveness, and formal in still other ways. When these varieties of formality are also appropriately designed, they tend, in operation, to beget
good legal content and good processes. David Hume once put this
even more strongly:
So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government,
and so little dependence have they on the humors and tempers of
men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them as any which the mathematical sci78
ences afford us.
For now, it is enough to provide a few examples that will remind
us of Hume's general truth that good form in basic functional elements tends to beget good content and good processes. When a legislature consists of persons who must at periodic intervals be re-elected
to continue in office they will, as John Locke also stressed, tend to
make better laws. 79 Yet the mode of composition of a legislature is a

matter of organizational and structural form. Similarly, when the
mode of operation of a legislature requires that proposed laws be publicized and subjected to scrutiny in committee hearings and in legislative debates, these procedurally formal features will tend to beget
good content in the laws finally adopted. At the same time, good
form in the design of procedures also tends to beget good processes
in actual operation. This is important not merely because such
processes tend to yield laws better in content, i.e., better outcomes. It
is also important because the form of such a process in actual operation may also be good in itself, as when a formally well-designed process operates fairly, and in a procedurally rational fashion that elicits
relevant general facts and brings reason to bear.
The same is plainly true of a court, mutatis mutandis. When a
court is appropriately formal in structural and procedural terms, it will
operate independently of political influence on the decision of particular cases, and of improper litigant influence, and will, in light of the
evidence and argument, decide cases more in accord with applicable
law and fact. That is, these formal features will tend to beget outcomes that are good in content. At the same time, such good form
78

DAVID HUME, POLITICAL WRITINGS

102 (Smart D. Warner & Donald W. Livingston

eds., 1994).
79 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 79 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,

1976).
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also begets good processes. This, too, is important not merely because
such processes beget better outcomes and so better content, but also
because an adjudicative process may, in actual operation, be good in
itself, as when a formally well designed process operates fairly and in a
procedurally rational fashion.8 0 In fact, good processes are probably
even more a function of good formal design than are good outcomes.
G. Appropriate Form in Precepts, in Basic Functional Elements,
and in the System as a Whole, Extends and Enriches the
Possible Goals and Means of Social and Civic Life
We have seen how appropriate form in the law is required for law
to serve as an effective means to policy goals, to general legal values, to
fundamental political values and more. I will consider one familiar
example of the use of law to serve policy goals. The exhaust from
automobiles causes air pollution in cities. For the legislature, let us
assume that this causal generalization itself generates a legal "meansgoal" hypothesis: if auto drivers are required by legal rules to use leadfree gasoline, this will substantially reduce pollution and thus contribute to the goal of securing cleaner air. Accordingly, the legislature
adopts rules requiring that new cars utilize only lead-free gasoline.
Now, such rules require not only necessary policy content, but appropriate form as well. They must be appropriately general, definite,
complete, and simple. They must also be appropriately expressed, encapsulated, and promulgated, all features of form.
Now, in this example, and in many others like it, the goal
(cleaner air), the means (lead-free gas), and the cause-effect relationship on which the rule is based, are all antecedently identifiable, definable, and describable on their own prior to any incorporation in
legal rules, or, indeed, prior to the existence of any law. Moreover, in
examples of this nature, means, goal, and causality have a reality all
their own quite independently of the law. We may assume that the law
contributes nothing to this reality as such. It is true that the use of law
to prohibit leaded gas serves the goal of improved air quality, and that
law itself here may be credited with adding importantly to our social
means. But apart from this, it cannot be said that such a use of law
extends and enriches the total range of possible goals and means that
citizens might pursue in social and civic life.
Yet in modern societies, law is typically used in many ways that
can be said to extend and enrich the range of possible goals and
means of social and civic life. As a result, citizens constantly entertain
and pursue goals and means that would not otherwise be available to
them. Indeed, it might even be said that the law creates, or contrib80

See supra note 69.
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utes to the creation of new varieties of social and civic life. 8 1 And in
this, appropriate legal form plays indispensable roles. Indeed, it is not
even possible to identify, define, and describe the goals and means
that the law itself thus makes possible without at least implicit reference to law and to its appropriate form.
Consider, for example, the goal that many citizens have of effectively leaving their property to certain of their descendants on death,
and consider the means of doing so by making a will. Such a goal and
such a means cannot be identified, defined, and described without at
least implicit reference to law and the appropriate legal forms for leaving property by will. Indeed, such a goal and such a means cannot be
pursued apart from law and its appropriate form. In these respects,
"leaving property by will" is quite unlike "improving the air by reducing the use of leaded gasoline." Not only are the latter goal and the
latter means wholly intelligible entirely apart from law; citizens might
even voluntarily seek to improve the air this way with considerable
effectiveness entirely without resort to any law or to any legal motivation at all. But this is simply not possible with respect to "leaving property by will," a type of goal and a type of means constituted and
defined by law itself. Thus, when the law provides for such things as
the making and implementation of wills, it extends and enriches the
menu of possible goals and possible means that citizens may pursue in
society. It makes new varieties of human activity and of social and
civic life possible.
Now, so far I have not merely recounted the familiar Hobbesian
story that without law there would be no order or social peace, and
therefore no commerce, no industry, no productive labor, no architecture, no arts, no letters and no culture at all. 8 2 Rather, what I wish
to stress here is that the affirmative (rather than merely restraining)
contribution of legal form to social and civic life here goes far beyond
the securing of order or social peace, important though these are.
Moreover, what I have recounted so far gives far more credit to law
and to its appropriate form than contemporary philosophical ac83
counts such as those of John Searle.
We might call law's contribution here the "INVENTIVE EFFECT
OF APPROPRIATE FORM IN LAW." Thus, the law invents and provides for new modes of human activity such as the disposition of property by will. Appropriate legal form is indispensable to such inventive
effects. In the case of leaving property by will, the law must define the
legally essential form of a valid will. The law must set this forth in
81 See B.J. Diggs, Rules and Utilitarianism,in CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM 203 passim
(Michael D. Bayles ed., 1968).
82 See HOBBES, supra note 25, at 80-84.
83
SeeJOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCrION OF SocIAL REAuTY passim (1995).
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prescriptive rules with appropriately formal attributes of generality,
definiteness, and completeness. There must also be rules with content specifying who has power to make a will, how, and with what effects. Such content is largely organizational in nature, and is in that
respect also formal. All these rules require appropriate expressional
and encapsulatory form, too.
The law and its appropriate form can, and does, extend and enrich the range of possible goals and means of social and civic life far
beyond the familiar case of "leaving property by will." It invents and
so provides for the recognized ownership and protection of property
in the first place, a highly complex cluster of legal constructs. It invents and provides for the creation of property interests to secure
loans of money. It invents and provides for entry into contractual relations. It invents and provides for the creation and operation of corporations, business associations, and still other organizations. It
invents and provides for marriage. It invents and provides for money.
And much more.
Nor is the inventiveness of appropriate form in law and through
law confined to new varieties of social and civic life and new goals and
means solely for persons acting as individuals, i.e., solely through individual "acts in the law" such as the making of a will. The law extends
and enriches the range of possible collective goals and means as well.
Consider for example, the collective goal of democracy as pursued
through such means .as the public election of lawmakers. Within a
particular society this goal and this means cannot be defined, described, and pursued apart from the legally constituted structures and
processes for the election of lawmakers in that society. Indeed, such
legal means just are very largely constituents of the goal of democracy
in that society, and so are not merely means, but part of the end itself.
Appropriate legal form is indispensable here. Thus, just as valid wills
and contracts (and all other such "private facilities") are inventions of
law, so, too are authoritative elections. The law defines, constitutes,
and so invents the essential form of elections. Through appropriate
legal form, a system expresses, enshrines, symbolizes, radiates, and enforces commitment to fundamental political values, including democracy. Democratic election of officials is simply a social invention that
is necessarily constituted partly by rules and other formal legal devices. Formal rules and other law are required to specify and structure
the organizational content of electoral processes. The same is true of
legislatures. Here, the appropriate legal forms may be said to create
the very possibility of a valued and fundamental form of social and
civic life. The social reality in which "elected legislators" exist and
carry out their duties presupposes formal electoral processes defined
and structured by law, and a legislature defined and structured by law.
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Such law has appropriate organizational content, and is formal in this
and other ways. There can be no place here for formlessness if these
processes are to serve democracy. Appropriate legal form thus makes
possible whole new modes of civic thought and action. With this, it
becomes meaningful to say, for example, "Edith and Joe want to run
for the House of Representatives. It has been their ambition to be
members of the majority party, to draft several major bills, especially
on fiscal matters, and to see them passed and signed into law."
Of course, the inventiveness of law for collective social life is
hardly limited to democratic elections and legislatures. The menu of
possible collective "acts in the law" extends far beyond electing and
legislating to official administering, adjudicating, interpreting, sanctioning, military defense, and much more. All of these are law-dependent goals and means. The menu includes all the goals and means of
government through law. And appropriate form is essential for all of
these. The extension and enrichment of possible individual and collective goals and means that appropriate legal form and the law bring
to social life must be counted as one of the most fundamental of all
contributions to modem civilization from any source.
CONCLUSION

In the literature of Western jurisprudence and legal philosophy,
appropriate form is the most neglected of law's general characteristics. Yet once it is duly conceptualized in all of its major varieties and
seen to be a relatively discrete general subject, and once a uniform
and stable nomenclature is introduced to identify and articulate the
formal features and subject matter of law, and once it can be seen to
have an existence and integrity all its own that does not collapse into
something else (such as substance or policy), it becomes possible to
give form its due. We can then see it for what it is, grasp its pervasiveness, identify the types of choices of design and implementation it
reflects and poses, differentiate its appropriateness from its inappropriateness, and determine its general jurisprudential and practical implications overall. In the end, it also becomes possible to put form in
its proper place in relation to other ingredients of law. Much more
remains that I will say about form in my forthcoming book, and my
views continue to be in the process of alteration and development.
For me, form is one of law's most important characteristics, though, of
course, there is far more to law than appropriate form. By now all this
may seem obvious, if not also banal, at least to some. Perhaps I may
be allowed to close, by way of analogy, with another passage from
Wittgenstein:
Philosophical problems can be compared to locks on safes, which
can be opened by dialling a certain word or number, so that no
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force can open the door until just this word has been hit upon, and
84
once it is hit upon any child can open it.

84 LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL OCCASIONS (1912-1951)
Klagge & Alfred Nordmann eds., 1993).
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